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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Conscription ended on June 30, 1973, and since then the U.S. Armed Forces rely 
upon volunteers to fill their ranks (Warner and Asch, 2001).  The dawn of the all-
volunteer force (AVF) ushered in a wave of concerns about attracting and retaining 
enough human capital to sustain the capabilities of the armed forces, particularly when 
economic conditions are favorable and/or when the nation is involved in conflict.  
Occasionally, these concerns appear well founded.  With a tight civilian labor market, the 
U.S. Armed Forces missed enlistment recruiting goals by 6,000 in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 
and 8,500 in FY 1999 (Warner and Asch, 2001).  More recently, several military services 
experienced recruitment challenges while engaged in the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) despite recent pay increases and enhanced incentives.  Clearly, the length and 
nature of current operations are more arduous than those previously experienced by the 
AVF.  As the flexibility and resilience of the AVF is tested, disparate outcomes are 
expected for different segments of the military population. 
The operational tempo (OPTEMPO)1 of the United States military has increased 
dramatically since the end of the Cold War (Fricker, 2002).  The post-Cold War military 
downsizing partially explains the amplified OPTEMPO, but changes in the U.S. National 
Security Strategy also led to military involvement in a myriad of humanitarian, disaster 
relief, peacemaking, and peacekeeping operations (Hosek and Totten, 2002).  On 
September 11th, the military’s operational environment changed for the foreseeable 
future.  Subsequently, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) have further intensified the OPTEMPO of all military services.  Thousands of 
military personnel were immediately impacted by unexpected deployments to extremely 
hostile environments.  Furthermore, these deployments often exceed the traditional 
deployment length with minimal turnaround time between deployments.  Under these 
conditions, many military members may re-evaluate their career decision, choosing
                                                 
1 Operational tempo is the number of days a military unit or individual service member operates away 
from home station (Rumsfeld, 2005). 
2 
instead to pursue a safer, more stable career in the civilian sector.  The probability of this 
occurrence is likely elevated for highly skilled members with lucrative civilian 
opportunities, such as physicians. 
The military services constantly struggle to recruit and retain ample physicians to 
support their mission.  The booming healthcare industry and ongoing military conflict 
contribute to recruiting and retention troubles.  In recent years, the Navy achieved its 
physician recruiting goals; however, meeting the 2005 goals for both active and reserve 
recruiting will be difficult (Hoewing, 2005).  In fact, the Navy only achieved about 58 
percent of the recruiting goal for active duty physicians and just 60 percent of the goal for 
reserve physicians in 2005.  In addition, the attrition rate for Navy physicians in FY 2003 
was 9.2 percent, slightly higher than the three-year average of 8.9 percent (Cowan, 2004).  
Furthermore, the loss rates in some specialties exceed 22-27 percent, creating severe 
shortages in critical wartime specialties (Cowan, 2002).  More troubling, the attrition rate 
is expected to climb based on retirement and resignation requests.  Higher OPTEMPO 
and longer deployment durations have been cited as the major reasons for this increase 
(Cowan, 2004). 
The 2005 Quick Poll2 conducted by Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and 
Technology (PERS-1) confirm the potentially detrimental impact of increased 
OPTEMPO on Navy Medical Corps officer retention.  The results illustrate that six of the 
top ten factors influencing Medical Corps officers to leave the Navy are related to 
OPTEMPO.3  As well, the results show that civilian job opportunities influence the 
retention decision of 70 percent of the physicians participating in the survey (Newell et 
al., 2005).  The combined effects of increased operational requirements and the lure of 
civilian employment could produce long-term deficits in the inventory of Navy 
                                                 
2 The 2005 Quick Poll was conducted May 11th-23rd 2005.  All Officers in the Medical, Dental, 
Medical Service, and Nurse Corps communities were selected to participate in the online survey.  The 
overall response rate was 33 percent including 1,321 Medical Corps officers (34 percent of Medical Corps 
officers). 
3 The six OPTEMPO factors influencing Medical Corps officers to leave the Navy and their respective 
percentages include impact of deployments on your family (70 percent), unpredictability of deployment (69 
percent), overall time spent away from home (63 percent), impact of being in the Navy on family (62 
percent), frequency of deployment (60 percent), and length of deployments (55 percent). 
3 
physicians.  Also, agricultural costs4 and time necessary to replace departing physicians 
can create significant short-term consequences.  Moreover, physician retention 
difficulties could produce spillover effects impacting force health protection capabilities 
and beneficiary care; thereby creating retention challenges elsewhere.  This thesis seeks 
to determine if the actual retention behavior of Navy Medical Corps officers at their first 
decision point is significantly different subsequent to the increased OPTEMPO prompted 
by the events of September 11th, primarily after the start of OIF. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Navy Medical Corps 
Unique among the corps of the Medical Department, the Medical Corps was 
never legally chartered; however, it is common knowledge that surgeons served aboard 
the first and subsequent naval vessels of the United States.  Although the term, “medical 
corps”, appears in a number of official and unofficial historical documents written in the 
late 1700’s, the birth of the Medical Corps is recorded as 3 March 1871.  The birth date 
was established based on an appropriations act that specifically referred to “officers of 
the medical corps on the active list.”5  This legislation also standardized relative ranks of 
medical officers and established the title of Surgeon General (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 
1969). 
Prior to the passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 19506, 
the “Doctor Draft” law, medical officers for the regular Navy were obtained exclusively 
by volunteer application; however, the induction of reserve medical officers was allowed 
through the “Ensign 1915” program.  Later, the “Berry Plan” offered two options to 
physicians graduating from medical school; begin active duty immediately to fulfill their 
military obligation or defer military service until completion of approved specialty 
training.  In the event that an insufficient number of physicians entered the military 
through voluntary programs, the Selective Service System held special drafts to meet the 
                                                 
4 Agricultural costs are the costs that the Navy pays to attract and retain physicians.  Generally, this 
includes recruitment costs, medical school costs and Graduate Medical Education for physician specialists. 
5 Appropriation Act, approved by Congress, 3 March 1871 (16 Stat.535) 
6 On 9 September 1950, Public Law 779 (Doctor Draft law) amended the Selective Service Act of 
1948. 
4 
deficit.  If drafted, physicians were required to immediately enter the military regardless 
of civilian practice or residency training (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1969). 
Currently, medical officers enter military service through a variety of accession 
programs; Armed Forces Health Profession Scholarship Program (AFHPSP), Uniformed 
Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), Financial Assistance Program 
(FAP), and direct accessions.  The majority of physicians enter under the AFHPSP where 
the military pays for their medical school education.  The Uniformed Services Health 
Profession Revitalization Act of 1972 authorized the AFHPSP and USUHS as 
complementary programs to provide the military with new means of obtaining active duty 
physicians once the draft ended in 1972.  This thesis focuses primarily on physicians 
accessed through AFHPSP and USUHS.  Those accessed through USUHS commit to a 
seven year minimum active duty obligation (ADO) and most AFHPSP accessions serve 
four year ADOs.  Further, the ADO may be extended by the physician’s participation in 
Graduate Medical Education (GME).  In addition to providing critical specialty training 
to meet wartime manpower requirements, the GME program serves as a recruitment and 
retention tool. 
As leaders of the Medical Department team, Medical Corps officers are generally 
responsible for the treatment of sick and injured personnel, the prevention and control of 
disease, and maintaining the health of command personnel.  Without a doubt, Force 
Health Protection is the most important mission of Naval Medicine.  Force Health 
Protection is comprised of five basic components;  
1. Preparing a healthy and fit force,  
2. Deploying medical personnel to protect our warriors in the battlefield,  
3. Restoring health on the battlefield,  
4. Providing care to our retired warriors through TRICARE for Life, and  
5. Providing world-class health care for all beneficiaries (Arthur, 2005). 
Achievement of this mission while responding to increased requirements to 
augment the operational forces fighting the GWOT was greatly enhanced by Naval 
Medicine’s Total Force Integration Plan, utilizing both active and reserve manpower 
5 
inventories (Cowan, 2003).  The Naval Reserve component is extremely important in 
supplementing the active duty medical force, especially during prolonged periods of 
conflict.   
2. Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) 
With an officer corps that is 31 percent smaller in 2000 than in 1986, today’s 
military personnel face deployments of increasing frequency, many of which are 
unplanned and unforeseen (Fricker, 2002).  One effect of the GWOT has been a 
significant increase in OPTEMPO (Rumsfeld, 2005).  Since September 11th, 
approximately one-third of the Fleet has been deployed on any given day.  Although 
similar to peace-time operations, the OPTEMPO of forward deployed units has increased 
(Krol, 2002).  When analyzing OPTEMPO, two broad categories are generally used; 
hostile duty and non-hostile duty.7  The expeditionary nature of the Navy/Marine Corps 
team requires constant readiness for short notice deployments to a myriad of missions, 
both hostile and non-hostile.  While fighting the GWOT, the Navy and Marine Corps also 
deployed personnel to several short-fused contingency operations; a Non-combatant 
Evacuation Operation in Liberia, a peacekeeping mission in Haiti, a humanitarian 
assistance mission to support South Asian tsunami victims, and a disaster relief mission 
following Hurricane Katrina, among others.  Each of these missions necessitated the 
support of Navy medical personnel, scores of which were activated from their shore-duty 
assignments. 
Although some Medical Corps officers are permanently assigned to operational 
units such as ships, aircraft squadrons, and Marine Corps units, most are assigned to a 
component unit of a Medical Treatment Facility (MTF).  During national emergencies or 
contingency operations, and when directed, selected medical units and/or individuals are 
mobilized from their respective MTF to support operational requirements.  Similarly, 
reserve Medical Corps officers are often mobilized to backfill MTF jobs vacated by their 
active duty counterparts; however, they are increasingly being mobilized to support 
operational units on the battlefield directly.  In fact, more than 1,000 Naval Reserve 
                                                 
7 Hostile duty is duty in an area or circumstance involving imminent danger, for instance, the 
operations in Haiti, Somalia, peacemaking and peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, and current operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Non-hostile duty may involve unaccompanied tours abroad, sea voyages in non-
hostile waters, disaster relief, humanitarian aid, nation building, and combined exercises (Hosek, 2004). 
6 
medical personnel were mobilized to active duty in support of OIF (Cotton, 2004).  On 
April 18, 2004, nearly one in six of Naval Medicine’s deployable personnel was deployed 
in support of operations fighting the war on terrorism.  At that point, in excess of 7,300 
active and reserve naval medical personnel had deployed in support of OIF (Cowan, 
2004).  During the age of the AVF, only Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
compare to this level of mobilization, but the length and nature of current operations are 
substantially different. 
3. Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (PERSTEMPO) 
By the nature of their business, military members expect a certain level of 
OPTEMPO.  Assignment onboard ships and other operational platforms virtually 
guarantee at least one deployment and numerous operational exercises during the Inter-
Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC).  Members with long sea rotations may experience 
upwards of three deployment cycles while assigned to a single platform.  In an effort to 
manage OPTEMPO and ensure a reasonable quality of life for Sailors and their families, 
the Navy instituted the Personnel Tempo of Operations (PERSTEMPO) Program in 
October 1985.  Prior to its implementation, long deployments were more common, but 
less often associated with national crises.  Accordingly, Sailors experiencing high 
underway time (non-deployed) and long deployments were reenlisting less frequently 
(Golding and Griffis, 2003). 
The Navy institutionalized its PERSTEMPO program with rules restricting the 
length of deployments, setting a floor on the time between deployments, and constraining 
the total time away from homeport8 (Golding & Griffis, 2003).  OPNAVINST 3000.13B 
expresses the primary drive of the program as preserving the quality of life while meeting 
national obligations.  Although the program applies to all active duty Navy commands 
and units, some unique units are designated as special PERSTEMPO program units due 
to their inability to meet PERSTEMPO program goals.9  While the policy was developed 
                                                 
8 The PERSTEMPO policy limits deployments to a maximum of 6 months (portal to portal), provides 
a minimum turn around ratio of 2.0:1, and requires that units spend a minimum of 50 percent of their time 
in homeport over a 5-year cycle calculated 3 years back and 2 years forward based on current schedules. 
9 Special PERSTEMPO program units include permanently forward deployed units operating with 
rotating crews, Navy Mobile Construction Battalions, Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines, Aviation Training 
Squadrons, Cryptologic Direct Support Personnel, and any operating/deploying command/unit whose 
personnel are assigned for less than 3-5 year tours and receive compensation for extended operating time 
beyond PERSTEMPO Program limits. 
7 
to preserve Sailors’ quality of life and retention, the standards were imposed on units, not 
individuals.  As a result, congressional legislation in 2000 directed the military services 
to monitor the PERSTEMPO of individuals and pay them for excessive time away 
(Golding and Griffis, 2004). 
4. Individual Tempo Program (ITEMPO) 
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 expanded the services’ 
PERSTEMPO programs with a requirement to track PERSTEMPO on an individual 
basis.  For this reason, the Navy developed its new Individual PERSTEMPO (ITEMPO) 
program to control the amount of time that every Sailor is required to be away from 
his/her homeport or permanent duty station.  Initially, Sailors exceeding 250 days 
deployed, in a rolling 365-day calendar, were entitled to $100 per day for each additional 
deployment day.10  The Navy sought to manage the program by requiring flag officer 
reviews when members reached 182 deployment days and again at the 220 deployment 
day mark.  Due to the expeditionary nature of the Navy and Marine Corps, the Navy 
pursued changes more harmonious with its operational pattern.  The proposed changes 
sought a new threshold of 500 deployment days in a two-year rolling cycle before Sailors 
were paid “high deployment pay.”  The FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act 
recognized the unique nature of the Navy and Marine Corps by allowing 400 deployment 
days over a 2 year rolling period before high deployment pay was triggered.  Although 
ITEMPO also applied to reservists serving on active duty, the FY 2002 National Defense 
Authorization Act tightened the initial guidance by applying the same “can’t go home at 
night” rules (Navy Personnel Command web page). 
Implementation of the ITEMPO program requires exacting management at all 
levels to succeed.  The overriding goal is to minimize the hardships of military service on 
Sailors and their families.  The imposition of significant financial costs was designed to 
curtail unreasonable separation due to military deployments or at least compensate 
Sailors for the inconvenience.  The earliest that anyone would have qualified for high-
deployment pay was November 2001.  Regrettably, the terrorists’ attacks on September 
11th, 2001 caused the Department of Defense (DoD) to suspend the high-deployment pay 
                                                 
10 Deployment days were originally defined as any day that a Sailor was away from his/her permanent 
duty station such that he/she could not go home at night; however, exceptions were allowed for schools and 
watch-standing. 
8 
aspect of ITEMPO indefinitely.  While commands must still report all qualifying 
ITEMPO events, the individual member’s ITEMPO calendar remains frozen until the 
suspension is lifted (Rhem, 2001). 
5. Retention 
To manage the overall force successfully, the military must balance accession of 
new members with the retention of already trained and skilled personnel (Rumsfeld, 
2005).  Obviously the goal is not to retain all eligible personnel; however, some critical 
skills warrant extraordinary efforts to meet overall manpower requirements.  Given the 
extensive investment in human capital in a resource constrained setting, the Navy can ill-
afford for retention to persistently be lower than planned levels.  In fighting the retention 
battle, the Navy must consider factors such as the civilian economic environment, the 
Sailors’ satisfaction with military life, the influence of family members, and Sailors’ 
opportunities within and outside the Navy.  The importance of Selective Reenlistment 
Bonuses, quality of life initiatives, special pays, and other retention levers cannot be 
overemphasized in managing Sailors’ retention behavior.  Yet, several wartime critical 
specialties remain undermanned.  Within the Medical Corps, these specialties include 
anesthesiologists, cardio-thoracic surgeons, and orthopedic surgeons (Cowan, 2002). 
Absent a draft, the Navy depends on some physicians to continue on active duty 
voluntarily to fill upper-level manpower requirements.  The principal impediment, to 
date, has been the disparity between military compensation and comparable civilian 
earnings, the civilian-military pay gap.  To mitigate the deficiency and secure their 
continued service, the Navy offers several special pays to eligible physicians: variable 
special pay11, board certified pay12, additional special pay13, incentive special pay14, and 
                                                 
11 Variable special pay is an automatic entitlement for Medical officers serving on active duty for 
periods of at least 1 year. 
12 Board certified pay is an entitlement for medical officers who are board certified in a medical 
specialty recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the Bureau of Osteopathic 
Specialties, or has attained Board Certification Equivalency. 
13 ASP is entitlement for Medical Corps officers who agree to remain on active duty for a period of 
not less than 1 year as computed from the effective date of the ASP agreement. 
14 Incentive special pay is a discretionary bonus given to Medical Corps officers intended to assist in 
alleviating shortages of medical officers who meet specified criteria. 
9 
multi-year special pay15.  Despite the mixture of special pays, the Navy is persistently 
challenged to preserve the appropriate assortment of physicians.  Facing a greater than 
ever civilian-military pay gap and a booming healthcare industry, the increased 
OPTEMPO experienced by military physicians during the GWOT may further 
complicate retention efforts.  
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and identify the significant factors 
associated with the behavior of United States Navy Medical Corps officers at their first 
retention decision.  The primary focus is the effect of deployments on the probability of 
retention but also includes other factors that may influence retention such as subspecialty, 
duty station type/location, and some demographic characteristics. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is whether or not the increased 
OPTEMPO subsequent to the events of September 11th has had an effect on the retention 
of Medical Corps officers at their first decision point.  Secondary research questions are: 
• Are Medical Corps officers facing increased deployments less likely to 
continue on active duty relative to those who are not deployed? 
• Do the factors affecting the retention decision of Medical Corps officers 
vary significantly by demographic characteristics? 
• Does subspecialty have any effect on the continuation decision of Medical 
Corps officers? 
• Does duty type/location affect the continuation behavior of Medical Corps 
officers?  In particular, does assignment to either Naval Medical Center, 
Portsmouth, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, or Naval Medical 
Center, San Diego affect the continuation behavior of physician 
specialists? 
                                                 
15 Multi-year special pay is a discretionary bonus given to Medical Corps officers intended to alleviate 




Chapter II provides a review of literature associated with the general issues of 
military retention, civilian healthcare retention, military physician retention, and effects 
of operational tempo on retention.  Chapter III describes the data sources, details the 
methodology used to collect the data, provides a preliminary data analysis of the 1999 
and 2002 cohort data files, and discusses the analytical methods employed during the 
analyses.  Chapter IV explains the dependent variable and the selection of the explanatory 
variables, and tenders rationales for expected outcomes of explanatory variables.  Chapter 
V presents the results of the analyses for General Medical Officers and specialists.  
Chapter VI offers conclusions and recommendations based on the analyses while 
indicating areas for further research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. RETENTION IN THE MILITARY 
As with any civilian organization, the military constantly struggles with the 
problem of retaining enough high-quality personnel.  The military’s retention challenge is 
especially daunting during periods of economic prosperity and when comparative civilian 
wages significantly outweigh military compensation.  Given the substantial direct and 
indirect costs associated with employee turnover, the military has made considerable 
investment in empirical research to identify important factors related to retention plans 
and retention behavior of military personnel.  Typically, military research has been 
conducted in one of three ways:  large-scale surveys, economic models of occupational 
choice, or theory-based conceptual models (Weiss et al., 2003). 
Results from large-scale surveys of military personnel have commonly been used 
to describe a host of factors associated with the intentions of military personnel to remain 
in the military (Weiss et al., 2003).  For instance, the General Accounting Office’s report 
of preliminary results from the Department of Defense 1999 Survey of Active Duty 
Members (Rabkin, 2000) used large-scale survey techniques to provide descriptive 
research on retention.  On the whole, the results showed a strong link between members’ 
overall satisfaction with military life and their likelihood to stay in the military.  With 
regards to turnover, service members reported that basic pay, amount of personal and 
family time, quality of leadership, job enjoyment, and deployments were the most 
important factors influencing their decision to leave active duty (Weiss et al., 2003). 
Multivariate retention models based on principles of general economic theories of 
occupational choice is another common method utilized to examine retention in the 
military.  In short, the basic premise of these models is that rational individuals make 
their occupational decisions in a utility maximizing framework.  For military personnel, 
the utility maximizing framework implies that individuals seek to maximize utility by 
making a decision either to stay in the military or leave the military for the civilian sector 
(Weiss et al., 2003).  The concept of utility maximization encompasses both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary factors.  The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) is a model based 
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on economic theory that is often used for analyzing retention behavior.  In the ACOL 
model of retention, the individual is assumed to compare the utility of leaving the 
military immediately with the utility of remaining for each possible future period of 
service.  The utility from staying or leaving depends on both the present value of the 
income stream and the present value of the monetary equivalent of any non-pecuniary 
aspects (Mehay & Hogan, 1998).  In general, multivariate models help the military 
formulate policies.  For example, Warner and Goldberg (1984) estimated an ACOL 
model indicating that a higher incidence of sea duty was associated with lower levels of 
first-term retention rates in the Navy.  Since its development, the ACOL model has 
undergone two major refinements; ACOL-2 and the Stochastic Cost of Leaving model.  
The refined versions represent a new class of multivariate models – Dynamic retention 
models (Weiss et al. 2003).  These refines essentially recognize that individuals differ by 
unobserved factors. 
The final method generally used in research conducted on military retention is the 
proposal and empirical evaluation of specific conceptual models of retention behavior 
(Weiss et al., 2003).  Utilizing the 1992 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel 
and their Spouses, Kerr (1997) proposed such a conceptual model for retention of first-
term and second-term enlisted Marines.  Kerr suggested that retention was a function of 
demographic characteristics, military experience, cognitive satisfaction with military life, 
and external factors such as alternative civilian job opportunities.  Further, Kerr stratified 
the sample by gender and term of enlistment, creating four groups.  His results 
demonstrated that many of the factors proposed were significant predictors of retention 
behavior; however, none were significant across all groups.  Thus, processes leading 
Marines to separate from the military were different for first-term and second-term males 
and females. 
B. CIVILIAN HEALTHCARE RETENTION 
The characteristics of the healthcare labor shortage are so often repeated that they 
have virtually become a mantra for healthcare executives.  Two out of three healthcare 
organizations are experiencing labor shortages, with 50 percent reporting long-term 
vacancies of six months or more in key positions (Pieper, 2003).  Multiple factors 
including a shrinking work force, an aging population, changing social attitudes toward 
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work, financial constraints, and public perception of healthcare contribute to a growing 
personnel problem for healthcare organizations across the country (Wolf, 2001).  As a 
result, they face an insufficient supply of nurses, pharmacists, and physicians.  In terms of 
the number of physicians, the number of medical school graduates remains relatively 
stagnant.  So, we are beginning to see signs of a significant physician shortage (Lanser, 
2003).  Recently, the American Medical Association confirmed the shortage of 
physicians in some regions and specialties while predicting additional shortages in the 
future (American Medical Association web page, 2005).  Given the concern that the labor 
shortage is generating, healthcare leaders should explore innovative ways – incentives, 
formalized career paths, continuing education, or mentoring – to hold on to the best 
employees (Lanser, 2000). 
Pathman et al. (2002) studied how physicians’ relative satisfaction and/or 
dissatisfaction influenced their plans for leaving their job.  Using a cross-sectional mail 
survey of 1,939 practicing generalists and specialists across the United States, they 
employed logistic regression analysis to assess whether physicians in the top and bottom 
quartiles of satisfaction were more or less likely to anticipate leaving their jobs within 2 
years, compared with physicians in the mid-satisfaction quartiles.  More than one-quarter 
of physicians anticipated a moderate-to-definite likelihood of leaving their practices 
within 2 years.  Further, their results showed that relative dissatisfaction with pay and 
with relationships with communities was associated with plans for leaving in nearly all 
physician groups. 
Rittenhouse et al. (2004) attempted to validate physicians’ self-reported intentions 
to leave clinical practice using a 1998 survey of urban California specialist physicians, 
the American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Master File, and direct 
ascertainment of physicians’ practice status in 2001.  Multivariate regression was used to 
predict both physicians’ intentions to leave clinical practice and their actual departure.  
Their analysis indicated that the strongest predictor of both intentions to leave clinical 
practice and actual departure from practice was older age.  In addition, physician 
dissatisfaction had a strong association with intention to leave clinical practice, but was 
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not associated with actual departure.  As such, Rittenhouse et al. conclude that self-
reported intention to leave practice may be more of a proxy for dissatisfaction than an 
accurate predictor of actual behavior. 
The economic boom of the 1990s created an unprecedented period of prosperity, 
characterized by low inflation and low unemployment.  During this period, the labor 
market for critical healthcare personnel tightened dramatically.  Good economic times 
combined with ever-expanding career opportunities exacerbated the cyclical labor 
shortages in healthcare.  While much was written about the nursing shortage, healthcare 
organizations also faced a decreasing supply of caregivers in other areas.  Thus, retaining 
the quality employees a healthcare organization already has is a considerable challenge 
(Ashbaugh, 2003).  In fact, the Workforce Efficiency study from Watson Wyatt Data 
Services showed that turnover rates within the healthcare industry during 2004 were 
higher than the overall industrial average and ranged from 18.6 percent for nonexempt 
employees to 15.9 percent for exempt employees (Report on Salary Surveys, 2005). 
C. RETENTION OF MILITARY PHYSICIANS 
The recruitment and retention of military physicians has plagued DoD since the 
inception of the AVF.  Although the Uniformed Services Health Profession 
Revitalization Act of 1972 assisted with the recruitment of military physicians, retention 
remains a persistent challenge.  While most empirical studies focus on the civilian-
military pay gap as the major retention barrier, other factors affect physicians’ retention 
behavior; e.g., accession source, specialty, gender, race, and satisfaction with military 
life.  Given the organizational structure, career paths, and multitude of physician 
specialties, the first stay-leave decision is generally identified as the most critical point 
for intervention. 
Gaffney (1988) utilized the 1985 Department of Defense (DoD) Survey of Officer 
and Enlisted Personnel and Military Spouses to analyze career orientation16 among DoD 
physicians.  Gaffney employed ordinary least squared (OLS) multiple regression, logistic 
(logit) regression, and factor analysis to isolate the factors that affect the career 
                                                 
16 Career Intention, the dichotomous dependent variable, was constructed from a survey question.  
Physicians who expected to serve less than 20 years were classified as short-term and those who expected 
to serve greater than 20 years were classified as long-term. 
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orientation of DoD physicians.  Abraham Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs”17 theory and 
Frederick Herzberg’s “two-factor”18 theory provided the basis for his selection of factors 
for analysis.  This turnover analysis was conducted on four cohorts:  all physicians, single 
physicians, married physicians, and couples (married physicians and their spouses).  
Demographic variables including gender, race, branch of service, and marital status were 
also included in the models that were estimated. 
All physician cohorts considered wages a significant factor in their military career 
decision.  Those indicating that they had sought civilian employment also had a 
significantly lower probability of military career orientation in all but one cohort, single 
physicians.  Gender was only significant for the single physician cohort; indicating that 
single females had a higher probability of military career orientation than single males.  
Race was uniformly insignificant across cohorts.  The impact on families became clearer 
in the couples cohort where family and adaptability concerns had a significant and 
negative impact on military career orientation. 
Franco (1989) made use of multivariate logistic regression to estimate the 
influence of demographic, tenure, economic, and perceptual variables on the retention 
behavior of Lieutenant and Lieutenant Commander Navy physicians with nine or fewer 
years of service.  Franco merged the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel 
with 1988 retention data, the 1985 Bureau of Medicine Information System (BUMIS) 
Medical Officer File, and the 1985 Medical Economics Survey of Civilian Physician 
Earnings to develop a retention model.  Franco’s analysis showed no statistically 
significant impact from race, marital status, gender, or the military/civilian pay 
differential.  Statistically significant variables that negatively influenced retention 
behavior included Lieutenant Commander (tenure), board certified specialists, trained 
specialists, and General Medical Officers when compared to Lieutenants in residency 
                                                 
17 Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” theory identified five basic needs:  physiological, safety, social, self-
esteem, and self-actualization.  Furthermore, Maslow contends that behavior is dominated by unfulfilled 
needs with basic needs taking precedence.  Thus, people systematically satisfy their needs beginning with 
the most basic and working up the hierarchy.  
18 Herzberg’s “two-factor” theory divides work factors into satisfiers and dissatisfiers.  A high degree 
of reward for satisfiers produces job satisfaction, but a low degree produces dissatisfaction.  In contrast, a 
high degree of reward for dissatisfiers produces indifference and a low degree produces dissatisfaction. 
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training.  Intrinsic and extrinsic job satisfaction variables produced a statistically 
significant positive influence on the retention behavior of Navy physicians. 
McMahon (1989) also developed a logit model to analyze the factors that 
influence the retention behavior of Navy fully trained physician specialists.  She 
constructed the population of fully trained specialists from BUMIS data and derived 
comparable civilian wages from American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC) 
survey data.  Although she focused on the military-civilian pay difference, her analysis 
controlled for other factors, such as family responsibilities (dependents), age, minority 
status, years of service towards retirement, propensity for military life (based on repeated 
decisions to stay by unobligated physicians), and the physicians’ source of entry.  The 
retention model predicted the likelihood that an individual specialist would decide to 
leave at the decision point and each unobligated physician was assumed to make a 
retention decision annually. 
McMahon’s model validated the assertion that higher civilian-military pay 
differentials were related to increased probability of leaving the Navy.  Having 
dependents was associated with an increased probability of leaving while higher age and 
being black or female were associated with decreased probability of leaving the Navy.  
Furthermore, she computed specialty-specific elasticities for 22 specialty classifications 
to refine the model illustrating that the civilian-military pay gap had varying implications 
for the probability of leaving the Navy based on the physician’s specialty. 
Brannman et al. (2000) evaluated Navy physician retention as part of their 
Provider Satisfaction Study.  In particular, they were interested in determining if 
identified dissatisfiers, including the military-civilian pay gap, were influencing Navy 
physicians to leave the military at greater rates than before.  The continuation rates 
appeared to remain steady between 1984 and 1999, however, aggregate continuation rates 
do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary continuation.  Therefore, Brannman 
et al. developed a way to isolate those Navy specialists who were eligible to make a 
stay/leave decision, but data limitations prevented them from isolating only those 
physicians making their first critical stay/leave decision.  As such, they analyzed all 
unobligated physicians.  They summarized the retention results by three major groupings:  
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surgical, evaluation and management, and ancillary specialties.  Further, they compared 
results in two time periods, FY87-92 (Pre-TRICARE) and FY93-98 (Post-TRICARE), in 
an attempt to determine whether physician retention had fallen as a result of TRICARE. 
Brannman et al. (2000) showed that retention of physicians with surgical 
specialties had declined since TRICARE was implemented.  The Pre-TRICARE retention 
was 33 percent compared to 20 percent since TRICARE began.  They also found similar 
patterns of declining retention in the other two groups.  Brannman et al. ascribed the 
declining retention to a widening military-civilian pay gap, inefficient working conditions 
and business practices, and a general devaluation of clinical excellence.  Furthermore, 
they asserted that the factors affecting Navy physician job satisfaction were being 
exacerbated by the increasing emphasis on provider productivity and optimization, 
without a commensurate alignment of staff and resources to achieve those goals. 
Christensen et al. (2002) provided a historical overview and retention analysis of 
Navy specialty physicians.  Their analysis showed that retention patterns were 
substantially different after the April 1988 change in obligation policy associated with 
GME training.19  Specifically, they found that the percentage of AFHPSP direct 
accessions that eventually became residents (and by definition specialists) was about 14 
percentage points lower after FY 1988 than before it.  Furthermore, the cumulative 
retention of fully trained specialists 2 years after completion of their initial active duty 
obligation was 7 percentage points higher since April 1988.  Christensen et al. contend 
that the combined increased attrition before residency and reduced attrition after it may 
explain why overall attrition rates were largely unchanged since FY 1987. 
Christensen et al. stratified the pool of specialists to provide more meaningful 
analysis.  Since some specialties had a small number of physicians, they used three broad 
categories to classify specialists – primary care specialists, surgical specialists, and other 
specialists.  The specialists were grouped as follows: 
                                                 
19 Before April 1988, in-house residencies were obligation neutral; however, the in-house residencies 
required a 2-year minimum service requirement upon residency completion.  After April 1988, in-house 
residencies incurred a year-for-year obligation, but the obligation could be served concurrently with any 
existing AFHPSP or USUHS obligation. 
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• Primary care specialties – family practice, internal medicine, pediatrics, 
and preventive/occupational medicine. 
• Surgical specialties – general surgery, neurological surgery, OB/GYN, 
ophthalmology, otolaryngology, orthopedic surgery, and urology. 
• Other specialties – aerospace medicine, anesthesiology, dermatology, 
emergency medicine, neurology, nuclear medicine, pathology, physical 
medicine, psychiatry, and radiology. 
With regard to primary care physicians, Christensen et al. found the cumulative 
attrition rates before and after the obligation change were 35 and 39 percent, respectively, 
but the difference was not statistically significant.  Furthermore, the average cumulative 
attrition rates 1, 2, 3, and 4 years after completion was 50, 55, 60, and 63 percent.  
Overall, the attrition rate for primary care physicians remained unaffected.  Conversely, 
the cumulative attrition rates for surgical specialists at ADO completion were lower after 
the obligation policy change than before it.  Specifically, the cumulative attrition rate was 
59 percent before the policy change and 44 percent after the policy change.  The 15 
percentage point difference was statistically significant.  Similarly, the cumulative 
attrition rates for other specialists before and after the obligation policy change were 54 
and 38 percent, respectively.  As with the surgical specialists, these attrition rates were 
statistically significant indicating a lower cumulative attrition rate following the policy 
change. 
Clearly, Navy physicians have lucrative civilian alternatives to military service.  
Thus, the civilian-military pay gap is often cited as the major retention challenge; 
however, other factors influence retention behavior.  In general, longer initial obligated 
service yields a higher retention rate; however, specialty opportunities in the civilian 
sector create some variance.  Increasingly, the pressures of operating in a managed care 
environment are affecting retention behavior.  Regardless, the Navy has achieved 
sufficient physician retention overall, but the recently increased OPTEMPO may 
significantly alter physicians’ retention behavior. 
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D. OPERATIONAL/PERSONNEL TEMPO AND RETENTION 
Many researchers have investigated the subject of OPTEMPO and its influence on 
retention.  The higher OPTEMPO produced by the post-Cold War National Security 
Strategy is widely believed to have a negative effect on the men and women of the U.S. 
Armed Forces (Tillson, 1999).  Yet, recent studies consistently indicate that a positive 
effect exists between deployment and retention.  In his testimony to the House Armed 
Services Committee, James Hosek (2004) stated that “the most striking observation about 
the effect of deployment on retention is that active duty personnel have shown 
themselves to be highly resilient to the demands placed on them by deployment.”  
However, Hosek acknowledged that the analysis was conducted using data from the 
1990s and warned that the current operational environment may produce different results.   
Cooke et al. (1992) used logistic regression to analyze the influence of 
PERSTEMPO on Navy enlisted retention.  They combined data from several sources to 
capture demographic, economic, and PERSTEMPO variables.  Their analysis was 
segmented into four different groups:  (1) four-year obligors at their first reenlistment 
decision, (2) married four-year obligors at their first reenlistment decision, (3) sea-
intensive occupations, and (4) careerists with eight to ten years of service.  The analysis 
controlled for:  demographic variables such as race, marital status, and paygrade; 
occupational categories like medical, supply, and surface engineering; PERSTEMPO 
variables including percentage of time underway (not deployed), time since deployment, 
and deployment length; economic variables such as unemployment rate and military-
civilian pay ratio. 
Cooke et al. (1992) revealed that the percentage of time underway when not 
deployed and longer deployments negatively influenced the retention decision of first-
term Sailors.  The effects were largest among married Sailors and those in sea-intensive 
occupations.  Consequently, they approximate that a five percent pay increase, relative to 
civilian earnings, or a one-to-two level increase in SRB is required across the board to 
counteract the reductions in retention associated with increased PERSTEMPO.  A much 
larger SRB would be required for Sailors in sea-intensive occupations. 
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Hosek and Totten (1998) conducted the first cross-service examination into the 
relationship between reenlistment and PERSTEMPO.  Specifically, their study 
investigated the question of whether long separation or hostile duty for active duty 
service members in the early and mid-1990s helped or hindered retention of first-term 
and early career enlisted personnel.  To measure PERSTEMPO, they constructed 
measures bearing on two aspects of PERSTEMPO:  time separated from family for 30 
consecutive days or more, and duty in a hostile area or for hazardous duty.  Existing data 
for these measures were based on the receipt of special pays paid as a result of family 
separation or duty in an area deemed hostile, namely Family Separation Allowance 
(FSA)20 and Hostile Fire Pay (HFP)21.  Table 1 illustrates the methodology used by 
Hosek and Totten (1998) to classify long and hostile duty based on the receipt of FSA 
and/or HFP. 
Table 1 Measures of Long or Hostile Duty Based on Receipt of FSA and HFP 
(From:  Hosek and Totten, 1998) 
 Family Separation Allowance 
Hostile Fire Pay No Yes 
No None Long (> 30 days) 
Yes Hostile Long and hostile 
Since members without dependents are not entitled to FSA, the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) constructed a unit deployment indicator22 to deduce 
their non-hostile deployments.  Further, they constructed four measures of long or hostile 
duty.  Two measures were group monthly rates, and two measures were individual-
member-level counts of months and episodes of long or hostile duty over a 24-month 
period.  Table 2 defines the measures developed and used in their analysis. 
                                                 
20 Family Separation Allowance is paid to members of the military that are involuntarily separated 
from their dependents for 30 days or more.  The purpose of FSA is to partially reimburse the military 
member for extra expenses related to the forced separation. 
21 Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Pay is paid to military members subject to hostile fire or explosion 
from hostile mines; to personnel serving in hostile fire areas or on vessels or aircraft, or in units, that 
engage in hostile action; and to other personnel in designated foreign areas where civil insurrection, civil 
war, terrorism, or wartime conditions make them subject to the threat of physical harm or imminent danger.  
22 The unit deployment indicator represents the condition where a unit consists of at least 10 members, 
at least 30 percent of the members have dependents, and at least 60 percent of the members with 
dependents receive FSA or HFP, or both. 
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Table 2 PERSTEMPO Measures of Long or Hostile Duty (From:  Hosek and 
Totten, 1998) 
Measure Definition 
Long or hostile duty – unit  The monthly rate associated with unit 
separation/deployment, e.g., the unit may be 
stationed abroad on an unaccompanied tour, 
afloat on a sea tour or deployed on a peace 
operation. 
Long or hostile duty – total The monthly rate inclusive of unit and individual 
(non-unit) duty.  Service members may have long 
or hostile duty even though their unit does not. 
Months of long or hostile duty A service member’s total months of long or 
hostile duty over 24 months. 
Episodes of long or hostile duty A service member’s separate episodes of long or 
hostile duty over 24 months. 
Hosek and Totten (1998) used a logit specification to relate the probability of 
reenlistment to a set of explanatory variables.  Their analysis found that having some 
long or hostile duty rather than none increased reenlistment.  The positive effect, 
however, was reduced as total and hostile months of duty increased.  The reduction 
occurred prominently among first-term personnel and weakly among early-career 
personnel.  With regard to episodes, personnel with at least one non-hostile episode were 
much more likely to reenlist than those with no episode.  But as more of the episodes 
became hostile, the positive effect of episodes on reenlistment declined.  They postulated 
that with increased hostile deployments, the overall positive effect of deployments might 
eventually become negative. 
Specifically, Hosek and Totten (1998) showed that first-term Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps personnel with no prior long or hostile duty were more likely to reenlist if 
given an initial three months of non-hostile duty – 28 percent more likely in the Army, 8 
percent in the Navy, and 6 percent in the Marine Corps.  Conversely, if given an initial 
three-month deployment to hostile duty, only Army first-term personnel were more 
inclined to reenlist.  Such initial hostile duty did not substantially change the reenlistment 
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probabilities among first-term Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel.  Regarding 
first-term personnel with previous long or hostile duty, assigning Army, Navy and Air 
Force personnel to an additional three months of non-hostile duty reduced reenlistment 
probabilities between 3 and 5 percent, but it had no effect on Marine Corps reenlistments.  
However, if those additional assignments involved hostilities, reenlistment probabilities 
dropped – by 17 percent in the Army, 11 percent in the Navy, 6 percent in the Marine 
Corps, and 2 percent in the Air Force.  Although early careerists were more acclimatized 
to operational requirements, some long or hostile duty increased reenlistment 
probabilities in all services by 6 percent to 11 percent.  Nevertheless, the prospect of 
hostile duty beyond that initial amount reduced reenlistment likelihood typically to a 
level slightly below what it would have been if the service member had no long or hostile 
deployments. 
Kirby and Naftel (1998) explored the topic of whether Reserve mobilization 
affected the retention of enlisted reservists following Operation Desert Shield/Storm.  
They combined data from the 1991 Guard/Reserve Survey of Officers and Enlisted 
Personnel and the Quarterly Master Personnel Files drawn from the Reserve Common 
Component Personnel Data System to obtain a longitudinal history of each respondent for 
three years after the survey period.  Their sample included 3,269 enlisted reservists with 
4-12 years of service of whom 1,752 were mobilized and 1,517 were not mobilized.  
Separate models were developed for those with 4-6 years of service and those with 7-12 
years of service.  Although mobilized reservists had a 5 percent lower retention rate, the 
difference was marginally insignificant.  Furthermore, the overall component differences 
between mobilized and non-mobilized groups are small and statistically insignificant 
despite significant difference among components.  In addition, some evidence suggested 
that the probability of being mobilized in future call-ups had a small and positive effect 
on retention. 
Since branches of the military service employ inconsistent terms and definitions 
for tempo-related events, Tillson (1999) developed three cause-related definitions to 
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explain tempo-related problems:  deployment tempo (DEPTEMPO)23, personnel tempo 
(PERSTEMPO)24, and operating tempo (OPTEMPO)25.  Tillson explained that the 
effects of tempo are often multiplied when a service member is affected sequentially or 
simultaneously by the three types of tempo.  With respect to DEPTEMPO alone, Tillson 
found that most service members expected to deploy to contingencies and most looked 
forward to such activities.  Further, only those with multiple deployments described 
DEPTEMPO as a problem.  Multiple deployments arose in two principal ways.  First, a 
service member either had a high demand/low density skill or was attached to high 
demand/low density unit.  Second, because of normal rotation of individuals among units 
(PERSTEMPO), some members incur multiple deployments as the military rotates units 
among contingencies.  The complex interactions between DEPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, 
and OPTEMPO create difficult and varying challenges for military leaders.  Tillson’s 
research attributed the preponderance of the troubles to an obsolete military personnel 
system. 
Hosek and Totten (2002) estimated two models of deployment and retention in 
their effort to determine whether deployment affects the reenlistment of enlisted 
members.  One model viewed reenlistment as a function of deployment indicators.  The 
second model had two equations:  one for reenlistment and one for the time to E-5 
promotion.  In the second model, deployment had a direct effect on reenlistment, but it 
also had an indirect effect.  The indirect effect operated through the effect of deployment 
on the time to E-5, and the effect of expected time to E-5 on reenlistment.  By allowing 
the error terms in the promotion and reenlistment equations to be correlated, 
unobservable factors affecting both outcomes could be detected.  The models were 
estimated by branch of service for first- and second-term personnel making a reenlistment 
decision between FY 1996 and FY 1999. 
                                                 
23 DEPTEMPO is the tempo related to deployment of individuals and units to meet the demands of the 
National Security Strategy, as in Bosnia or Saudi Arabia, or simply to meet day-to-day forward presence 
needs. 
24 PERSTEMPO is largely the tempo created by the personnel system, e.g., permanent change of 
station moves, termination of command tours, and assignment to schools. 
25 OPTEMPO is the work-related tempo that service members face on a day-to-day basis even when 
they are not suffering from deployment tempo. 
24 
Hosek and Totten’s deployment/reenlistment model treated reenlistment as a 
function of the member’s deployment variables, education level, Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score category, occupational area, race/ethnicity, gender, 
dependency status, unemployment rate at entry, current unemployment rate, and fiscal 
year.  The two-equation model retained the same variables in the reenlistment equation 
but also inserted the expected time to promotion to E-5.  Their promotion equation 
included the variables in the reenlistment equation, indicators of the member’s promotion 
speed to E-4, and indicators of the calendar quarter when the member entered military 
service. 
Hosek and Totten (2002) again used HFP and FSA to construct their deployment 
measures.  Similar to their 1998 study, they used a DMDC-constructed indicator of unit 
deployment for members that were not eligible for FSA.  Two measures were constructed 
from the PERSTEMPO file:  deployments and months of deployment.  Both measures 
were counted over a three-year period ending three months before the month of the 
reenlist or leave decision.  The three-month “buffer” was utilized to control for reverse 
causality. 
With few exceptions, Hosek and Totten’s one-equation model indicated that 
reenlistment among members who deployed was at least as high as reenlistment among 
members who did not deploy.  In point of fact, reenlistments for those deployed were 
often considerably higher.  When deployments negatively influenced reenlistment, the 
effect was minimal.  For first term personnel, reenlistment typically rose with non-hostile 
deployments and it did not change with respect to hostile deployments.  In particular, 
first-term reenlistments in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps rose with the number 
of non-hostile deployments; however, reenlistments among Navy members with some 
deployments were higher, but reenlistments did not rise with the number of non-hostile 
deployments.  Hostile deployments for first-term personnel had a small effect on 
reenlistment.  For Army and Marine Corps personnel, reenlistment changed little as the 
number of hostile deployments increased.  Conversely, first-term Air Force and Navy 
personnel, who previously deployed for non-hostile missions, reenlisted at lower rates as  
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their hostile deployments went from zero to one or from one to two.  Moreover, the full-
interaction specification model26 revealed that first-term members with the most 
deployments were less likely to reenlist. 
Hosek and Totten (2002) demonstrated that second-term reenlistments for all 
military services generally rose with non-hostile deployments and with the first and 
second hostile deployment.  In contrast, second-term reenlistments declined somewhat 
for Army and Marine Corps members with three or more hostile deployments but did not 
for Navy or Air Force members. 
The joint model of promotion speed and reenlistment indicated that time to E-5 
was shorter with a greater number of non-hostile deployments but was little affected by 
the number of hostile deployments.  Although deployment tended to reduce time to E-5, 
the reduction was small.  Furthermore, Hosek and Totten (2002) found that a shorter 
expected time to E-5 resulted in only slightly higher reenlistment probability.  The 
authors also determined that regardless of deployment type, members with dependents 
had a higher reenlistment probability which tended to increase with the number of hostile 
and non-hostile deployments. 
Fricker (2002) investigated the association between long and/or hostile 
deployment duty and the retention of junior and midgrade officers in all branches of the 
military.  He used the same deployment measures created by Hosek and Totten (1998) 
that were based on the receipt of special pays during deployment – FSA and HFP.  The 
data analyzed were drawn from the PERSTEMPO database and contained all officers on 
active duty between December 1987 and September 1999.  For junior officers, those 
officers commissioned after December 1986 whose initial obligation ended before 
September 1998 were included in the analysis.27  For midgrade officers, Fricker included 
those officers whose initial obligation expired between November 1992 and September 
1998.  Junior and midgrade officers were modeled separately since many junior officers 
leave the military after their initial obligation.  Furthermore, each military service was                                                  
26 In the full interaction specification, the deployment variables indicate combinations of non-hostile 
and hostile deployments.  
27 Fricker’s analysis looked one year after the expiration of each officer’s initial service obligation and 
evaluated those who remained on active duty versus those who did not.  The one-year period allows for 
delays in leaving caused by no fixed term of service and required resignation notice. 
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modeled independently to account for differences in services’ policies, practices, and 
organizational cultures.  In each model, he evaluated the effect of long and/or hostile 
deployments within 36 months of the expiration of initial service obligation or 36 months 
prior to the officer’s exit date (or September 1999 if still on active duty), for junior and 
midgrade officers respectively. 
Since other factors can affect the retention decision, covariates for occupation, 
race, gender, accession source, and family status28 were included in the junior officer 
model.  The midgrade officer model included additional time-varying covariates for rank, 
educational level, whether the officer had been promoted in the last year, whether the 
officer received an advanced degree in the past two years, and indicators for each year.  
The model for junior officer retention after initial service obligation was based on logistic 
regression techniques.  The midgrade officer retention models were based on survival 
analysis techniques. 
The results of Fricker’s analysis of junior officers showed that the number of 
deployments significantly reduced officer separations.  The number of hostile 
deployments was significant in increasing officer separations in the Air Force.  After 
1995 when the drawdown of the officer corps stabilized, the number of deployments 
increased officer separations in the Navy, but continued to reduce separations in the 
Army.  Hostile deployments after 1995 raised officer separations in the Army and the 
Marine Corps.  In addition, female officers in the Army and Air Force were more likely 
to separate than their male counterparts.  Across services, those with dependents were 
less likely to separate from the military.  Finally, race produced varying effects across 
services with African-Americans and Asians in the Army and African-Americans in the 
Air Force experiencing lower separations while Hispanics in the Navy were more likely 
to separate than their white peers. 
Fricker’s midgrade officer results again provided a lower separation rate for those 
who deployed; however, hostile deployments for midgrade officers revealed differences 
across services.  Midgrade officers in the Navy were less likely to separate if they 
deployed to hostile areas, but the likelihood of separation for midgrade officers in the 
                                                 
28 Family status variables included either single or had dependents at the end of the initial service 
obligation. 
27 
Army and Air Force increased following a hostile deployment.  As in the junior officer 
model, midgrade officers with dependents were less likely to separate from all branches 
of the military.  Female midgrade officers in the Army and Air Force were still more 
prone to separation; however, female midgrade officers in the Navy separated less 
frequently than their male peers.  African-American midgrade officers were universally 
less likely to separate from any branch of service than their white counterparts. 
Fricker also evaluated officer retention with respect to only the demographic 
variables producing identical results.  Across all services and ranks, officers with families 
were more likely to remain on active duty compared to their single colleagues.  Female 
officers in the Army and Air Force generally separated more frequently than male 
officers while Navy midgrade female officers separated less often than male officers.  
With respect to racial differences, midgrade minority officers were less likely to leave 
service; however, Hispanic junior officers in the Navy were more likely to leave the 
military. 
Golding and Griffis (2004) sought to update the Cooke et al. study by analyzing 
Sailors’ retention behavior using 1990s personnel and ship employment data.  The 
previous study utilized 1980s data, but it may not reflect current trends since the Navy’s 
PERSTEMPO guidelines became effective in 1986.  Golding and Griffis tested the 
relationship between reenlistment and PERSTEMPO by merging individual ship data 
with personnel data to characterize Sailors’ PERSTEMPO experiences.  Next, they 
compared the arduousness of Sailors’ deployment29 experiences with their reenlistment 
behavior.  Finally, to measure the effect of high PERSTEMPO on Sailors, they conducted 
regression analyses using logit specifications of Sailors’ reenlistment behavior, with each 
Sailor as the unit of observation. 
Golding and Griffis (2004) merged data from the Enlisted Master Record with 
deployment data from the Ship Employment History to create a final data set containing 
                                                 
29 Deployment was defined as time away from homeport greater than 56 days (not including extended 
overhauls and maintenance away from homeport).  Ships and submarines assigned to overseas homeports 
were excluded from analysis due to unreliable data. 
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information for 46,283 Sailors, after restrictions and exclusions30 were imposed.  Their 
analysis included PERSTEMPO measures for deployment length, turnaround ratio, the 
time since last deployment, and non-deployed underway days.  Furthermore, they 
controlled for in-port workload, Sailor’s ability, ship characteristics, economic 
opportunities, and Sailor’s demographic characteristics.  Unlike the earlier Cooke et al. 
study, they found no effect from long deployments on reenlistment.  Conversely, short 
deployments (under 4 months) yielded higher reenlistment probabilities.  Sailors with the 
quickest turnaround displayed reenlistment rates 1.9 percentage points lower, whereas 
Sailors with the slowest turnaround had reenlistment rates 1.2 percentage points higher.  
In addition, Sailors experiencing significant non-deployed underway time and long 
maintenance activities while in port also reenlisted at lower rates.  When analyzing 
PERSTEMPO effects during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Golding and Griffis concluded 
that PERSTEMPO experiences were less important to reenlistment decisions for 
participants than for the other Sailors studied. 
The literature review on OPTEMPO and its impact on retention reveals that the 
effect varies across services, groups, and time.  Cooke et al. (1992) showed that the 
percentage of time underway when not deployed and longer deployments negatively 
influenced retention, particularly among married Sailors and those in sea-intensive 
occupations.  In contrast, Hosek and Totten (1998) discovered that having some long or 
hostile duty rather than none increased reenlistment.  The positive effect, however, was 
reduced as total and hostile months of duty increased.  Further, personnel with at least 
one non-hostile episode were much more likely to reenlist than those with no episode.  
Within the Reserve component, Kirby and Naftel (1998) found that differences between 
mobilized and non-mobilized groups were small and statistically insignificant.  In 
addition, some evidence suggested that the probability of being mobilized in future call-
ups had a small and positive effect on retention.  Similarly, Hosek and Totten (2002) 
showed that reenlistment among members who deployed was at least as high as 
reenlistment among members who did not deploy; however, the effects differed for 
hostile deployments depending on branch of service.  This finding was consistent with 
                                                 
30 The sample was restricted to Sailors who had served at least 30 months on their surface ship and 
who had completed a deployment.  Sailors stationed overseas, those who cross-decked, women, Training 
and Administration of Reserves (TAR) Sailors, and prior service Sailors were excluded.   
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their previous study where hostile episodes reduced the positive reenlistment effects.  In 
the same way, Fricker (2002) demonstrated diverse outcomes for junior and mid-grade 
officers.  Unlike Cooke et al. (1992) and Hosek and Totten (1998), Golding and Griffis 
(2004) showed that long deployments, following implementation of PERSTEMPO 
guidelines, were insignificant in affecting retention behavior.  On the other hand, a rapid 
turnaround time significantly influenced retention.  Although most studies controlled for 
many additional observable factors that could affect retention, some factors such as 
patriotism are not easily quantified.  Despite the initial display of patriotism, the current 
operational environment of the GWOT, characterized by multiple, long hostile 
deployments with minimal turnaround time, could exert stronger influences on retention 
behavior.  Therefore, current OPTEMPO effects on retention may substantially deviate 
from the generally observed positive effect. 
E. EFFECT OF OPTEMPO ON RETENTION OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL  
Research regarding the impact of OPTEMPO on the retention of medical 
personnel is extremely limited.  Due to increased concerns, Kirby and Naftel (1998) 
specifically investigated the retention of reserve enlisted medical personnel following 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm.  Their analysis found no statistical difference in retention 
of medical and non-medical enlisted personnel, either in their bivariate or multivariate 
analyses.  Likewise, Fricker (2002) controlled for occupational field in his study on the 
effect of long and/or hostile deployment duty on the retention of junior and midgrade 
officers.  Accordingly, Fricker calculated odds ratios for junior officers and hazard ratios 
for midgrade officers based on their occupation.  These ratios demonstrated that junior 
and midgrade officers serving in the medical field who had experienced a non-hostile or 
hostile deployment were less likely to separate than other officers in the medical field 
who did not deploy. 
Pierre (2005) analyzed the effect of increased OPTEMPO (Post-9/11) on the 
retention of first-term Navy Hospital Corpsmen.  She obtained two data files from 
DMDC, one for first-term Hospital Corpsmen on active duty on September 30, 1998 who 
were eligible to reenlist/separate prior to September 11, 2001 and another file for 
Hospital Corpsmen on active duty on September 11, 2001 who could reenlist/separate 
prior to March 2004.  She estimated a logit model that incorporated individual and 
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organizational factors to evaluate the effect of increased OPTEMPO on retention.  The 
study results indicated that first-term Hospital Corpsmen who deployed were more likely 
to reenlist, regardless of whether they were deployed from a shore duty or sea duty 
assignment.  Furthermore, those who deployed following the terrorists’ attacks on 
September 11th reenlisted at higher rates than those who did not deploy during that 
timeframe. 
F. CONCLUSION 
An overview of the literature illustrates that retention is an important issue for 
both the private and public sectors.  Mainly, the concern revolves around the significant 
direct and indirect costs associated with people leaving their organizations.  For years, the 
military’s risk of turnover was compounded as they struggled to maintain pay parity with 
the civilian sector.  Although much progress has been made in closing the military-
civilian pay gap, some occupations still experience substantial pay differentials.  Military 
health care professionals, particularly physicians, are probably the most significantly 
impacted.  Therefore, the military employs a variety of special pays to entice physicians 
to continue their military service.  Unfortunately, a myriad of non-pecuniary factors also 
influence the retention behavior of physicians. 
Despite their increased discomfort with the military’s implementation of managed 
care business practices, physician retention rates have not suffered substantially, probably 
because these same pressures also exist in the civilian sector.  Yet, one non-pecuniary 
factor that is predominately associated with military service could significantly alter 
physicians’ retention behavior – increased OPTEMPO.  Previous research on the effects 
of OPTEMPO on retention reveal varied results; however, an overall positive trend is 
reported in most recent studies.  Nonetheless, several studies showed a significant 
difference between the effects of hostile and non-hostile deployments.  In comparison, 
the length and nature of military operations during previously studied periods were 
substantially different than military operations following September 11th, particularly 
since the beginning of OIF.  Although Pierre (2005) found that deployments since 
September 11th increased the retention of first-term Hospital Corpsmen, we cannot 
assume that the same effect exists for physicians who face considerably larger financial 
incentives in the civilian sector. 
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The focus of this thesis is to evaluate whether the current operational 
environment, characterized by frequent hostile deployments with minimal turn-around 
time, has affected the retention behavior of Navy physicians.  Similar to Pierre’s analysis 
for Hospital Corpsmen, the analysis utilizes a logistic regression framework consisting of 
basic demographic and military experience variables to discover key attributes that 
impact the physician’s first retention decision.  Further, a difference-in-difference 
estimator is employed to calculate the effect (if any) of deployments since the 
OPTEMPO increased.  No previous research has focused on the possible impacts of 
increased OPTEMPO on the retention of Navy physicians.  Considering the present 
physician recruitment and retention challenges, any further obstacles could erode the 
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III. DATA SOURCES, GENERAL METHODOLOGY, 
PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS, AND ANALYTICAL METHOD 
A. DATA SOURCES 
No single data source provides sufficient data to analyze the effect of deployment 
on Medical Corps officer retention.  Although the Bureau of Medicine Information 
System (BUMIS) is often recognized as the most reliable data source for Navy 
physicians, it was unavailable for this analysis.  Instead, data from three readily available 
sources were used:  the Officer Master File, the Health Manpower Personnel Data 
System, and the individuals’ pay file.  The Officer Master File provided general 
demographic information while the Health Manpower Personnel Data System provided 
specific professional information to identify when physicians, either generalists or 
specialists, made their first retention decision.  The individuals’ pay file identified 
whether or not a physician received deployment pays, FSA and/or HFP.  The Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) compiled and combined the data by performing a social 
security number match for two distinct cohorts:  all active duty Medical Corps officers 
serving in the Navy on 1 October 1999 and all active duty Medical Corps officers serving 
in the Navy on 1 October 200231.  The general methodology section details how the data 
within each source were utilized in the analysis. 
1. Officer Master File  
The Officer Master File (OMF) offered a plethora of demographic and general 
information; however, many data elements were either incomplete or not applicable for 
Medical Corps officers.  The following data elements were incorporated into the analysis 
from this file:  assigned unit identification code (UIC), years of service (YOS), gender, 
race, dependency status, and marital status.  In addition to the initial data elements, an 
annual snapshot of the member’s assigned UIC was utilized in the analysis.  Furthermore, 
YOS was adjusted to reflect the YOS most proximate to the retention decision point.  
Most important, the OMF supplied the loss date for those officers who left military 
service. 
                                                 
31 The 1999 and 2002 cohorts were selected for two primary reasons.  First, the data in the Health 
Manpower Personnel Data System prior to 1999 utilized a different format and many data fields were 
corrupted.  Second, choosing 2002 versus 2001 reduces the impact of other non-measurable factors that 
could affect the retention decision immediately following the traumatic events of 9/11. 
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2. Health Manpower Personnel Data System 
The Health Manpower Personnel Data System (HMPDS) contains various data 
for DoD healthcare professionals.  The current analysis of Navy Medical Corps officers 
includes data elements for source of commission, health profession begin date, 
subspecialty, and graduate professional education (type and source).  Given the 
matriculation of general practitioners into specialties, an annual snapshot of graduate 
professional education was used to categorize medical specialists and determine the 
appropriate retention decision point.  The corruption of the FY2000 HMPDS data 
presented no difficulties since previous and subsequent years were available.  Similarly, 
the unavailability of FY2005 HMPDS data presented no significant challenges since the 
analysis only included physicians who faced a retention decision before the end of 
FY2004. 
3. Pay File 
The pay file supplied data indicating whether or not physicians received 
deployment pays – FSA and/or HFP.  The monthly amounts paid to each physician are 
used to determine who deployed.  If deployment pays were received during the month, 
the physician was considered deployed during that time frame.  The deployment pay 
history for each cohort begins one year earlier in order to provide some historical 
deployment data for all individuals facing a retention decision.  For example, deployment 
pay data for the 1999 cohort includes FY1998 – FY2002.  Likewise, the 2002 cohort pay 
data includes FY2001 – FY2005. 
B. GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
Since AFHPSP and USUHS accessions mainly enter as General Medical Officers 
(GMOs), most physicians extend their initial obligation to obtain specialty training.  
Accordingly, separate models were developed for General Medical Officers32 and 
specialists.  The analysis does not extend to current sub-specialists.  Key components in 
the analysis included:  classifying the physicians into the correct category at the retention 
decision point based on the end of their initial obligation while accommodating 
                                                 
32 General Medical Officers include physicians in subspecialty codes 15A0 (Aviation Medicine), 15F0 
(General Medicine), and 15U0 (Undersea Medicine). 
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matriculation into medical specialties, determining which physicians deployed prior to 
making their retention decision, and establishing where specialists were assigned when 
making their retention decision. 
1. End of Initial Obligation 
The end of initial obligation is considered a key retention decision point.  For 
GMOs with no residency training, the initial commitment is typically the contract 
obligation based on their accessioning program.  USUHS accessions incur a seven year 
obligation and most AFHPSP accessions incur a four year obligation.  All USUHS 
accessions and many AFHPSP accessions attend a military internship during the first year 
of military service.  Since the military internship is obligation neutral, USUHS accessions 
serve eight years to fulfill their commitment while the majority of AFHPSP physicians 
serve five years.  Using the source of commission code and the date when physicians 
began serving as military health professionals, a preliminary end of initial obligation was 
calculated.  Although some AFHPSP accessions have a lesser obligation, the minimum 
obligation for all accessioning programs is two years.  As such, physicians who separated 
before completing two total years of service were deleted from the sample.  Similarly, not 
all AFHPSP accessions complete a military internship, thus they incur a shorter initial 
obligation.  Consequently, AFHPSP physicians separating with between two and five 
years of service were assumed to have separated at the end of a lesser obligation.  
Further, GMOs that complete either Flight Surgeon or Undersea Medicine training must 
serve at least two years in that capacity.  Therefore, some obligations were extended to 
meet this requirement, but most were unaffected because the initial obligation exceeded 
the minimum service requirement. 
For specialists, the initial obligation includes the accessioning program obligation 
and any obligation incurred for residency training.  The time spent in residency training 
does not discharge the initial obligation, but both obligations are served concurrently.  
Given the length of GME and the required payback period, the majority of physician 
specialists must extend their initial obligation to complete residency training.  Thus, 
physicians who began their first specialty GME before the end of their initial obligation 
were classified as specialists and their obligations were adjusted accordingly.  Current 
sub-specialists were deleted from the sample and GME beyond the first specialty 
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residency training was ignored due to data limitations.  The following data elements from 
HMPDS facilitated the appropriate classification of physicians:  subspecialty code, 
graduate professional education date, graduate professional education projected 
completion date, and graduate professional education source.  Inevitably, some 
physicians pursue civilian residency training.  Those who are not on active duty while 
attending civilian residency training incur a residency training obligation of two years.  
Otherwise, Table 3 details the assumed residency training obligation undertaken for 
military funded training.  The corresponding residency training obligation was added to 
the GME completion date to establish when specialists were eligible to make their first 
retention decision. 
Table 3 Residency Training Obligation 
Subspecialty Code Specialty Residency Training 
Obligation 
15A1 Aerospace Medicine 2 years 
15B0 General Anesthesia 3 years 
15C0 General Surgery 4 years 
15D0 General Neurological Surgery 6 years 
15E0 General Obstetrics/Gynecology 3 years 
15G0 General Ophthalmology 3 years 
15H0 General Orthopedic Surgery  4 years 
15I0 General Otolaryngology 4 years 
15J0 General Urology 5 years 
15M0 General Pathology 4 years 
16N0 General Dermatology 3 years 
16P0 General Emergency Medicine 3 years 
16Q0 General Family Practice 2 years 
16R0 General Internal Medicine 2 years 
16T0 General Neurology 3 years 
16V0 General Pediatrics 2 years 
16X0 General Psychiatry 3 years 
16Y0 Diagnostic Radiology 4 years 
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Unlike enlisted personnel, officers do not serve for a fixed period of time and they 
are formally required to resign their commission to leave the military (Fricker).  
Therefore, most officers who decide to separate from the military are unlikely to depart 
exactly at the end of their obligation.  To account for timing and service considerations, 
the analysis provides a one-year period after their initial obligation for physicians to leave 
before they are classified as “stayers.”  The assumption is that officers who depart within 
the one-year window intended to leave at the end of their obligation but may not have 
been able to leave until some time later.  Hence, an adjusted end of initial obligation was 
created by extending the preliminary end of initial obligation by one year.  Based on the 
loss date provided by the OMF, physicians separating before the adjusted end of initial 
obligation were classified as “leavers.”  Otherwise, the assumption is that they chose to 
stay in the military. 
2. Deployment Indicator 
The main interest of this thesis is the effect of deployment on Medical Corps 
officer retention; therefore, a deployment indicator was created to identify those 
physicians who deployed using the deployment pay data.  If a physician received either 
FSA or HFP, or both, he or she was considered deployed.  Only deployments occurring 
before the physician either separated or was classified as a “stayer” are considered in the 
analysis.  Although it is possible that some physicians deployed without receiving either 
deployment pay, the impact is minimized by the nature of current deployments and the 
physicians’ demographic characteristics. 
3. Duty Assignment Type and/or Location 
Often the type of duty or duty location can influence the retention decision, either 
by the nature of the assignment or by organization-specific attributes.  For specialists, this 
thesis seeks to explore differences between being assigned to one of the “Big 3” (Naval 
Medical Center, Portsmouth, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, or Naval Medical 
Center, San Diego) as compared to an assignment elsewhere.  Using the annual snapshot 
of the assigned UIC, specialists were categorized as being either assigned to Naval 
Medical Center, Portsmouth, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Naval Medical 
38 
Center, San Diego, or assigned to a different command when they reached the retention 
decision point.  The analysis incorporated all UICs (core and components) because the 
same general organizational policies apply. 
C. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
The final combined data set consisted of 1,320 observations after deleting those 
with missing values and applying the above mentioned constraints.  Table 4 shows the 
number of observations by year for those eligible to make a retention decision. 
Table 4 Number of GMOs and Specialists by Year of Continuation Eligibility 
 1999 2002 Total 
General Medical Officers 258 199 457 
Specialists 552 311 863 
Total 810 510 1,320 
 
1. General Medical Officers 
a. Data Description by Year 
Table 5 provides a description of GMOs considered in the analysis.  
Frequency distributions and descriptive statistics are used to offer some insight into the 
characteristics of the GMOs in the 1999 and 2002 samples. 










Gender (%)    
Male 74.03 76.88 75.27 
Female 25.97 23.12 24.73 
Race (%)    
White 81.00 76.89 79.21 
Black 5.43 6.53 5.91 
Hispanic 3.88 4.02 3.94 
Other Race 9.69 12.56 10.94 
Marital/Dependency Status (%)    
Married with children (MWC) 45.35 50.75 47.70 
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Married without children (MNC) 1.94 4.02 2.85 
Single with children (SWC)*** 1.55 24.12 11.38 
Single without children (SNC)*** 51.16 21.11 38.07 
Years of Service    
Average Years of Service 4.90 4.85 4.88 
Deployment Status (%)***    
No Deployments 62.02 45.73 54.92 
One or more deployments 37.98 54.27 45.08 
Occupational Specialty (%)    
General Medicine (GM) 57.36 51.26 54.70 
Flight Surgeon (FS) 34.11 41.20 37.20 
Undersea Medicine (UM) 8.53 7.54 8.10 
Retention (%)    
Stay 28.29 23.12 26.04 
*** ChiSq statistic significant at .01 level 
 
The preliminary bivariate analysis looking at the data by year provides 
limited insight into the continuation behavior of GMOs.  Demographically, the samples 
are relatively similar except for dependency status.  Males constitute a slightly higher 
percentage of the 2002 sample, at nearly 77 percent, compared to 74 percent of the 1999 
sample.  There are no significant differences in the composition of the two samples with 
respect to race.  Further, the average years of service is slightly lower for the 2002 
sample, but again the difference is insignificant.  Although the distribution of MWC and 
MNC fluctuates, the differences are trivial.  Conversely, the samples significantly vary 
for SWC and SNC.  In the 1999 sample, single Sailors without dependents account for 
51.16 percent of the sample, but only 21.11 percent of the 2002 sample.  Quite the 
opposite, single Sailors with dependents constitute only 1.55 percent of the 1999 sample; 
however, they represent 24.12 percent of the 2002 sample.  The significant increase of 
SWC and decrease of SNC, particularly SWC, might result from some element of GMO 
self-selection, possibly due to the increasing OPTEMPO. 
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With regards to deployment status, a significantly larger percentage of 
GMOs in the 2002 sample deployed.  Approximately 38 percent of the 1999 sample 
deployed compared to more than 54 percent of the 2002 sample.  As a consequence, the 
proportion of non-deployers also appreciably diverged.  Non-deployers accounted for 
62.02 percent of the 1999 sample but only 45.73 percent of the 2002 sample.  
Occupationally, the distribution of GMOs experiences minor fluctuations; however, it 
remains relatively constant across time periods with no significant variation. 
In summary, the 1999 and 2002 samples for GMOs are demographically 
similar except for dependency status.  On the contrary, the deployment tempo 
significantly increases in the latter sample.  The increase in deployments also likely 
influenced the significant shift in the percentage of eligible single Sailors through 
simultaneity.  For example, a single GMO with dependents in the latter sample may not 
apply for military residency training because he/she desires to minimize his/her active 
duty obligation due to the personal conflict between family responsibility and the current 
OPTEMPO.  As a result, the number of single Sailors with dependents increases in the 
latter sample. 
b. Data Description of GMO Stayers 
Table 6 provides a more detailed insight into the continuation behavior of 
GMOs across the two periods. 









Gender (%)    
Male 30.89 25.49 28.49 
Female 20.90 15.22 18.58 
Race (%)    
White 28.23 25.49 27.07 
Black 14.29 15.38 14.81 
Hispanic 20.00 0.00 11.11 
Other Race 40.00 20.00 30.00 
Marital/Dependency Status (%)    
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Married with children (MWC) 33.33 25.74 29.82 
Married without children (MNC) 40.00 50.00 46.15 
Single with children (SWC) 50.00 12.50 15.38 
Single without children (SNC) 22.73 23.81 22.99 
Years of Service    
Average Years of Service (Stayers) 5.79 6.39 6.02 
Average Years of Service (Leavers) 4.54 4.39 4.47 
Deployment Status (%)    
No Deployments 23.75 27.47 25.10 
One or more deployments*** 35.71 19.44 27.18 
Occupational Specialty (%)    
General Medicine (GM) 17.57 14.71 16.40 
Flight Surgeon (FS) 36.36 30.49 33.53 
Undersea Medicine (UM)* 68.18 40.00 56.76 
*** Chi-Sq statistic significant at .01 level 
    * Chi-Sq statistic significant at .10 level 
 
Overall, the GMO continuation rate declines more than 5 percentage 
points from 1999 to 2002.  Consistently, the percentage of male GMOs remaining on 
active duty is higher than the percentage of females that decide to stay; however, both 
male and female continuation rates declined in 2002 compared to 1999.  The 15.38 
percent continuation rate for black GMOs in 2002 is slightly higher when compared to 
their 14.29 percent continuation rate in 1999, but the continuation rate for all other races 
declined.  The continuation rate for GMOs with dependents in 1999 was higher than 
those with dependents in 2002.  On the other hand, single and married GMOs without 
dependents remained on active duty at higher rates in 2002 than the previous period.  For 
single GMOs without dependents the 2002 continuation rate of 23.81 percent differed 
slightly compared to the 1999 rate of 22.73.  While the average years of service for 
stayers increased over time, the leavers departed with fewer years of service in 2002 than 
in 1999. 
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Regarding GMOs that deployed, the 35.71 percent continuation rate in 
1999 is significantly higher than the 19.44 percent continuation rate in 2002.  If they did 
not deploy, the 1999 sample continued on active duty at a lower rate, 23.75 percent, 
compared to the 27.47 percent continuation rate of 2002 non-deployers.  Concerning 
occupational specialty, all GMO sub-groups had lower continuation rates in 2002 relative 
to 1999, but the 28.18 percentage point decline in continuation for Undersea Medicine 
physicians represents the only noteworthy difference. 
Clearly, the decline in GMO continuation appears across all spectrums 
despite minimal increases in the continuation of blacks, GMOs without dependents, and 
non-deployers.  The most dramatic shifts appear in the behavior of physicians who 
deployed, those single with dependents, and Undersea Medicine physicians.  Given the 
increased OPTEMPO, these results are not surprising. 
2. Specialists 
a. Data Description by Year 
Table 7 details the description of specialists considered in the analysis.  
Frequency distributions and descriptive statistics are used to offer some insight into the 
characteristics of the specialists in the 1999 and 2002 samples. 









Gender (%)    
Male 71.92 71.06 71.61 
Female 28.08 28.94 28.39 
Race (%)    
White 88.22 86.82 87.72 
Black** 1.81 4.50 2.78 
Hispanic 3.44 2.25 3.01 
Other Race 6.52 6.43 6.49 
Marital/Dependency Status (%)    
Married with children (MWC) 71.01 73.63 71.96 
Married without children (MNC) 9.42 6.43 8.34 
43 
Single with children (SWC)*** 1.63 5.47 3.01 
Single without children (SNC) 17.93 14.47 16.69 
Years of Service    
Average Years of Service 8.81 8.75 8.79 
Duty Location (%)    
Duty Outside Big Three 73.01 71.70 72.54 
Duty at NNMC 7.07 7.07 7.07 
Duty at NMCP 10.14 10.93 10.43 
Duty at NMCSD 9.78 10.29 9.96 
Deployment Status (%)***    
No Deployments 85.87 70.42 80.30 
One or more deployments 14.13 29.58 19.70 
Occupational Specialty (%)    
Primary Care Specialists (PC) 48.01 43.08 46.24 
Surgical Specialists (SURG) 31.88 32.80 32.21 
Other Specialists (OSPEC) 20.11 24.12 21.55 
Retention (%)    
Stay** 57.97 49.84 55.04 
*** Chi-Sq statistic significant at .01 level 
  ** Chi-Sq statistic significant at .05 level 
 
Demographically, the two samples are nearly identical with two 
noteworthy exceptions.  First, black specialists only constitute 1.81 percent of the 1999 
sample compared to 4.50 percent of the 2002 sample.  Second, the percentage of single 
specialists with dependents significantly increased from 1.63 percent in 1999 to 5.47 
percent in 2002.  Otherwise, the samples are relatively unwavering across the 
demographic dimension.  Furthermore, the duty location and occupational specialty 
distributions appear similar across time periods.  Quite the opposite, the deployment 
status significantly differs, as anticipated.  In 1999, only 14.13 percent of specialists 
deployed prior to making their continuation decision.  In contrast, 29.58 percent of the 
2002 sample experienced deployments before reaching their decision point.  Finally, the 
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percent of stayers significantly deviated – almost 58 percent of the 1999 sample remained 
on active duty while only 50 percent of the 2002 sample decided to continue their 
military service. 
b. Data Description of Specialist Stayers 
Table 8 shows the continuation behavior of specialists considered in the 
analysis.  In evaluating whether a major change in continuation occurred, the sample size 
affected the significance of some variables (i.e. Hispanic) that initially appear significant. 









Gender (%)    
Male** 59.45 51.13 56.47 
Female 54.19 46.67 51.43 
Race (%)    
White** 58.11 48.89 54.82 
Black 60.00 64.29 62.50 
Hispanic 47.37 71.43 53.85 
Other Race 61.11 45.00 55.36 
Marital/Dependency Status (%)    
Married with children (MWC)* 56.12 48.91 53.46 
Married without children (MNC) 65.38 50.00 61.11 
Single with children (SWC)# 77.78 35.29 50.00 
Single without children (SNC) 59.60 60.00 59.72 
Years of Service    
Average Years of Service (Stayers)+++ 9.32 10.17 9.60 
Average Years of Service (Leavers)++ 8.10 7.34 7.79 
Duty Location (%)    
Duty Outside Big Three** 59.55 50.67 56.39 
Duty at NNMC 43.59 54.55 47.54 
Duty at NMCP 46.43 41.18 44.44 
Duty at NMCSD* 68.52 50.00 61.63 
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Deployment Status (%)    
No Deployments 55.49 48.86 53.39 
One or more deployments*** 73.08 52.17 61.76 
Occupational Specialty (%)    
Primary Care Specialists (PC)** 68.30 55.97 64.16 
Surgical Specialists (SURG) 44.89 39.22 42.81 
Other Specialists (OSPEC)* 54.05 53.33 53.76 
***  Chi-Sq statistic significant at .01 level 
  **  Chi-Sq statistic significant at .05 level 
    *  Chi-Sq statistic significant at .10 level 
    #  Fisher’s Exact test P < 0.10 
+++ T-statistic for difference in means significant at .01 level 
++   T-statistic for difference in means significant at .05 level 
 
In general, the continuation rate of specialists declined approximately 8 
percentage points from 1999 to 2002.  Even though males and females appear to evenly 
absorb the decrease in continuation only the decline in male continuation is significantly 
different in 2002 compared to 1999.  With respect to race, the continuation rate for white 
specialists and specialists of other races declined while black and Hispanic specialists 
continued at higher rates during 2002.  The decline for white specialists was roughly 10 
percentage points and appreciably different in 2002 compared to 1999.  While the 
continuation rate for specialists of other races declined by over 16 percentage points from 
1999 to 2002, the difference was of no consequence.  The continuation rates of blacks 
and Hispanics increased by 4 and 24 percentage points, respectively, from 1999 to 2002, 
but again the change was unimportant. 
Specialists with family obligations continued on active duty at lower rates 
in 2002 compared to 1999; however, the continuation rate of single specialists without 
dependents remained constant at roughly 60 percent.  Those married with dependents that 
chose to remain on active duty significantly declined by more than 7 percentage points 
between 1999 and 2002.  The continuation rate for married specialists without children 
declined by more than 15 percentage points from 65.38 percent in 1999 to 50 percent in 
2002, but the change was inconsequential.  The most dramatic and noteworthy decrease 
occurred for single specialists with dependents.  Nearly 78 percent of single specialists 
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with dependents continued on active duty in 1999 compared to only 35 percent in 2002.  
Regarding total years of service, those choosing to stay had more years of service in 2002 
compared to their counterparts in 1999.  Similar to the GMOs, those choosing to leave 
service departed with fewer years of service in 2002 when compared to 1999.  The 
divergence in average years of service between the two time periods was significant for 
both groups; stayers and leavers. 
Specialists assigned to Naval Medical Center, San Diego appear to 
continue at higher rates compared to specialists assigned elsewhere; however, their 
continuation rates dramatically decreased by 18.52 percentage point from 1999 to 2002.  
In contrast, those assigned to National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda experienced an 
increased, but insignificant, continuation rate from 43.59 percent in 1999 to 54.55 percent 
in 2002.  For those stationed at Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth when making their 
decision, the continuation rate declined a mere 5 percentage points from 46.43 percent in 
1999 to 41.18 percent in 2002.  Specialists assigned to commands outside of the “Big 3” 
also had a lower continuation rate of 50.67 percent in 2002 when compared to 59.55 
percent in 1999. 
All occupational specialty sub-groups experienced a lower continuation 
rate in 2002 relative to 1999.  Primary Care specialists’ continuation rates radically 
shifted from 68.30 percent in 1999 to 55.97 percent in 2002.  The continuation rate of 
Surgical specialists was 44.89 percent in 1999 and only 39.22 percent in 2002.  Other 
specialists experienced less variation in continuation, but overall the change was 
significant. 
The non-deployers experienced a decreased continuation rate from 55.49 
percent in 1999 to 48.86 percent in 2002; however, the change was insignificant. In 
contrast, the continuation rate for deployed specialists significantly diminished from 73 
percent in 1999. to only 52 percent in 2002. 
Certainly, the continuation rates for specialists have substantially declined 
in the latter sample.  The most significant variation occurred for those deployed.  Thus, 
the preliminary results appear to indicate that the increased OPTEMPO has significantly 
affected the continuation of physician specialists in a negative manner. 
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D. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
1. Theoretical Model 
Multiple regression analysis allows estimating retention models incorporating 
many influences.  In the logistic regression model, the dependent variable is binary, 
where stay equals 1 and leave equals 0.  The theoretical model is: 
Li = ln (Pi/1-Pi) = α + βxi 
where: 
 Li = log of odds ratio 
 Pi = Probability of continuation, given the personal attributes xi 
 α = Intercept parameter 
 β =Vector of slope parameters 
 xi = Vector of explanatory variables 
2. Multivariate Logistic Regression Models 
Listed below are the initial models used to analyze the continuation behavior of 
physicians.  Modification (if any) will be discussed in the analysis results section for 
generalists and specialists.  A full description of the variable definitions is provided in 
Chapter IV. 
1. General Medical Officer Model 
The initial empirical model used to find predicted probabilities for 
continuation of General Medical Officers is: 
ln (Pi/1-Pi) =  β0 + β1(FEMALE) + β2(BLACK) + β3(HISPANIC) +  
  β4(OTHERRACE) + β5(MNC) + β6(SWC) + β7(SNC) +  
  β8(DEPLOYED) + β9(FS) + β10(UM) + β11(YOS) 
where: 
 FEMALE = being female 
 BLACK = being African-American 
 HISPANIC = being Hispanic 
 OTHERRACE = being any race other than white, African-American or Hispanic 
 MNC = being married without dependents 
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 SWC = being single with dependents 
 SNC = being single without dependents 
 DEPLOYED = being deployed prior to making retention decision 
 FS = being a Flight Surgeon 
 UM = being an Undersea Medicine physician 
 YOS = an additional year of service 
 
2. Specialists Model 
The initial empirical model used to find predicted probabilities for 
continuation of physician specialists is: 
ln (Pi/1-Pi) = β0 + β1(FEMALE) + β2(BLACK) + β3(HISPANIC) +  
  β4(OTHERRACE) + β5(MNC) + β6(SWC) + β7(SNC) +  
  β8(DEPLOYED) + β9(NMCP) + β10(NNMC) +  
  β11(NMCSD) + β12(SURG) + β13(OSPEC) + β14(YOS) 
where: 
 NMCP = being assigned to Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth when making the 
continuation decision 
 NNMC = being assigned to National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda when 
making the continuation decision 
 NMCSD = being assigned to Naval Medical Center, San Diego when making the 
continuation decision 
 SURG = being a surgical specialist 
 OSPEC = being any other physician specialist other than primary care or surgical 
 
The sign of the parameter estimate indicates whether the variable is associated 
with an increase or decrease in the probability of continuation.  The predicted Wald Chi-
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square statistic indicates if a given variable is significant at the usual levels used for 
hypothesis testing.  The chi-square statistic is derived by dividing the parameter estimate 
by its standard error and squaring the results.  The probability of exceeding the statistic 
through random chance indicates whether the variable may be accepted or rejected for a 
given significance level. 
Partial effects are evaluated using the notional person approach.  The notional 
person defines a “typical” person to determine the overall continuation probability.  The 
change in probability associated with any given explanatory variable that is statistically 
significant can then be calculated for this “typical” person. 
3. Difference-in-Difference Estimator 
The Difference-in Difference (or “double difference”) estimator is the difference 
in average outcome in the treatment group before and after treatment minus the 
difference in average outcome of the control group before and after treatment.  For this 
thesis, the control group is the non-deployers in 1999 and 2002 while the treatment group 
contains those that deployed.  The treatment is the increased OPTEMPO experienced 
during the latter time period. 
This framework involves a simple comparison of the change in behavior of non-
deployers, who were not affected by the increased OPTEMPO, with the change in 
behavior of deployers, who were affected by the increased OPTEMPO.  Hence, to 
determine the Difference-in-Difference estimator, two variables are added to the 
previously discussed models – one to account for the common time trend and one to 
measure the true effect of treatment.  The effect of OPTEMPO is controlled for by the 
DEPLOYED variable indicating whether an individual deployed.  Likewise, time is 
controlled for by the addition of the FY02 variable representing whether each observation 
is for a physician eligible to make a continuation decision before or after the increase in 
OPTEMPO.  The coefficient for the variable of interest (FY02_DEPLOYED) therefore 
measures the effect of being deployed, relative to not being deployed, after the 
OPTEMPO increased, relative to before. 
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Hence, the Difference-in-Difference estimator for General Medical Officers is 
determined by the following model: 
ln (Pi/1-Pi) =  β0 + β1(FEMALE) + β2(BLACK) + β3(HISPANIC) +  
  β4(OTHERRACE) + β5(MNC) + β6(SWC) + β7(SNC) +  
  β8(DEPLOYED) + β9(FS) + β10(UM) + β11(YOS) +  
  β12(FY02) + β13(FY02_DEPLOYED) 
where: 
 FY02 = time trend common to control and treatment groups  
 FY02_DEPLOYED = effect of treatment (increased OPTEMPO) 
 
Similarly, the Difference-in-Difference estimator for specialists is found using the 
following model: 
ln (Pi/1-Pi) = β0 + β1(FEMALE) + β2(BLACK) + β3(HISPANIC) +  
  β4(OTHERRACE) + β5(MNC) + β6(SWC) + β7(SNC) +  
  β8(DEPLOYED) + β9(NMCP) + β10(NNMC) +  
  β11(NMCSD) + β12(SURG) + β13(OSPEC) + β14(YOS) +  
  β15(FY02) + β16(FY02_DEPLOYED) 
where: 
 FY02 = time trend common to control and treatment groups  
 FY02_DEPLOYED = effect of treatment (increased OPTEMPO) 
 
51 
IV. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
A. DISCUSSION 
This section of the thesis defines and discusses the explanatory and dependent 
variables used to analyze the retention of Navy Medical Corps officers facing their first 
retention decision.  The discussion also details the rationale for the expected effect of 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable.  The expected signs of explanatory 
variables are summarized in table format. 
B. VARIABLES 
1. Explanatory Variables 
To evaluate the continuation behavior of physicians reaching their first retention 
decision point, two categories of explanatory variables are used; demographic and 
military experience. 
a. Demographic Variables 
(1) Gender (MALE, FEMALE).  The gender variable is binary 
and categorized as either male or female.  The base case is MALE, for both generalists 
and specialists.  Historically in all military branches, the type of duty and available billets 
were more restrictive for female service members; however, great strides have been made 
within the last several decades to promote an equitable working environment.  Although 
the current limitations are less constraining for female physicians, the remaining 
obstacles can influence the continuation decision if viewed negatively.  In addition, the 
enhanced integration of female Sailors onboard ship has expanded opportunities for 
female physicians.  These expanded opportunities could also sway the continuation 
decision when shipboard duty is considered undesirable.  Furthermore, females typically 
bear the largest burden of maintaining the family unit.  When military responsibilities and 
family responsibilities conflict, female service members are probably more affected.  
Although these opportunities and restrictions produce differing effects, either positive or 
negative, based on individual preferences, the overall effect of the FEMALE variable is 
expected to negatively affect the continuation decision of generalists and specialists alike, 
especially when the OPTEMPO intensifies the conflict between military and family 
responsibilities. 
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(2) Race/Ethnic Group (WHITE, BLACK, HISPANIC, 
OTHERRACE).  Race/ethnic group is depicted by four classes:  WHITE, BLACK, 
HISPANIC, and OTHERRACE.  The base case is WHITE.  Relative to the civilian 
sector, the military is generally viewed as providing members of minority groups with 
equitable opportunities for advancement and training.  If this contention holds true, 
minority members would be more likely to continue military service.  Thus, the 
anticipated effect on retention of each minority group is positive for both generalists and 
specialists. 
(3) Marital/Dependency Status (MWC, MNC, SWC, SNC).  
Although marital and dependency status vary over time, data limitations required the 
classification at the beginning of each period, 1 October 1999 and 1 October 2002.  
Marital/dependency status was divided into four categories:  Married with dependents 
(MWC), Married without dependents (MNC), Single with dependents (SWC), and Single 
without dependents (SNC).  The base case is MWC since it represents the majority of 
generalists and specialists.  Those with family obligations (MWC, SWC, and MNC) are 
expected to be more career-focused; however, the family separation caused by routine 
deployments can create substantial personal conflict.  This internal quarrel is likely 
heightened when the deployment entails duty within a hostile zone involved in military 
conflict.  In particular, single individuals with family obligations are expected to be more 
negatively impacted by military service due to deployments because they have the sole 
responsibility for caring for their dependents; thus, the likely overall effect of SWC is 
hypothesized to be negative for specialists and generalists alike.  In contrast, those 
without dependents, whether married or not, are presumed to be less negatively impacted 
than those married with dependents.  Hence, the effect of SNC and MNC are projected to 
be positive when evaluated against MWC. 
b. Military Experience Variables 
(1) Deployment Status (NODEPLOY, DEPLOYED).  The 
deployment experience of physicians is described dichotomously.  The base case, 
NODEPLOY, represents the majority of physicians who did not deploy while 
DEPLOYED symbolizes those physicians who deployed at least once before reaching the 
retention decision point.  Intuitively, the expectation is that deployments would 
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negatively influence continuation behavior; however, previous research findings offer 
different results.  Fricker found that deployments (hostile or non-hostile) actually 
produced a positive effect on the retention of military officers; however, hostile 
deployments tended to lessen the positive effect.  Similarly, Hosek & Totten found that 
deployments positively affected the retention of enlisted service members.  In addition, 
Pierre discovered that the positive effect of deployments extended to Navy Hospital 
Corpsmen. 
Since many General Medical Officers are expected to deploy 
during their first obligation, the effect could be either positive or negative depending on 
their personal preferences and deployment experience.  Furthermore, the composition of 
GMOs possibly contains a comparable mixture of those positively and negatively 
impacted by deployment since the current analysis permits the matriculation into 
specialties.  If a GMO dislikes the deployment aspect of military life, they may forego the 
opportunity to pursue military residency training and thus remain a GMO until separating 
from the Navy.  Alternatively, if the GMO, enjoys the deployment experience, they could 
postpone residency training until some time after their initial obligation, choosing instead 
to remain a GMO where the probability for deployment is higher.  As such, the 
anticipated effect on GMO continuation is neither positive nor negative. 
Most specialists generally have limited deployment opportunities 
unless the nation is engaged in conflict or participating in Military Operations Other Than 
War (MOOTW).  Similar to GMOs, the retention behavior of specialists could either be 
positively or negatively influenced by deployment depending on their preferences and 
experience.  Since some specialists may have deployed as GMOs and subsequently chose 
to continue active military service, the supposition is that deployments do not negatively 
influence their behavior.  However, that belief is speculative, at best, since specialists 
may continue on active duty only for GME, or because the chosen specialty has limited 
deployment possibility.  The specialists that continue military service only for GME are 
more likely to terminate their military service, regardless of whether they deploy or not.  
On the other hand, physicians that are not predisposed to separation may be influenced by 
deployments.  If they embrace the adventurous nature of the military, deployments may 
positively influence their continuation behavior.  However, if deployments are seen as a 
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disruption to their personal and/or professional lives, the impact can be negative.  Given 
the substantial change in OPTEMPO during the period evaluated in this analysis, no 
expectation is proposed on the effect of deployment on the retention of specialists despite 
the outcome of previous research.  Unlike previous periods studied, the current 
environment has resulted in many specialists being deployed to extremely hostile 
environments.  The volume of deployments, coupled with the duration of the present 
conflict, limits the self-selection mechanism that likely occurred in previous periods.  
Therefore, specialists that prefer not to deploy can no longer escape the expeditionary 
nature of military medicine.  As a result, they may chose to terminate military service at 
higher rates than previously experienced. 
(2) Years of Service (YOS).  The years of service variable is 
continuous and represents the individual’s cumulative years of creditable military service 
when facing the retention decision.  For generalists, the variation in YOS is likely less 
than for specialists due to varying obligations for specialty training.  Regardless, 
dissatisfied physicians are anticipated to separate at the earliest opportunity, with fewer 
years of service.  Given the military’s retirement plan, it is expected that the YOS 
variable will positively affect retention behavior because individuals with more years of 
service are closer to qualifying for retirement benefits. 
(3) Occupational Specialty (GM, FS, UM) and (PC, SURG, 
OSPEC) for generalist and specialists, respectively.  The base case for GMOs is General 
Medicine (GM) and Primary Care (PC) is the base case for specialists. 
 General Medical Officers typically enter the Navy with no 
previous military experience.  For interested personnel, Flight Surgery (FS) and Undersea 
Medicine (UM) training opportunities are available.  Since these groups receive more 
military-specific training, they are expected to be more likely to continue on active duty 
when compared to General Medicine physicians. 
 To ease interpretation, the specialists were grouped into 
categories similar to the Christensen et al. study.  Table 9 reflects the specialties assigned 
to each group, primary care specialists (PC), surgical specialists (SURG), and other 
specialists (OSPEC). 
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Table 9 Categories of Physician Specialists 
Subspecialty Code Specialty Specialty Category 
15A1 Aerospace Medicine Other Specialist 
15B0 General Anesthesia Surgical Specialist 
15C0 General Surgery Surgical Specialist 
15D0 General Neurological Surgery Surgical Specialist 
15E0 General Obstetrics/Gynecology Surgical Specialist 
15G0 General Ophthalmology Surgical Specialist 
15H0 General Orthopedic Surgery  Surgical Specialist 
15I0 General Otolaryngology Surgical Specialist 
15J0 General Urology Surgical Specialist 
15M0 General Pathology Other Specialist 
16N0 General Dermatology Other Specialist 
16P0 General Emergency Medicine Other Specialist 
16Q0 General Family Practice Primary Care Specialist 
16R0 General Internal Medicine Primary Care Specialist 
16T0 General Neurology Other Specialist 
16V0 General Pediatrics Primary Care Specialist 
16X0 General Psychiatry Other Specialist 
16Y0 Diagnostic Radiology Other Specialist 
 
 The most often cited obstacle for physician retention is the 
civilian-military pay gap despite the various special pays offered by the military to 
enhance retention.  Since physician specialists outside the primary care realm can often 
demand higher civilian compensation, the expected effect of SURG and OSPEC is 
negative when compared to PC. 
(4) Duty Type/Location (NOBIG3, NNMC, NMCP, NMCSD) 
for specialists only.  Using the annual snapshot of the assigned UIC, the duty 
type/location closest to the retention decision point was determined.  The base case is 
NOBIG3 which represents all duty stations other than National Naval Medical Center, 
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Bethesda, Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, or Naval Medical Center, San Diego.  Duty 
within the Navy’s largest and busiest hospitals is expected to differ from duty outside the 
“Big 3” due to residency training programs, increased pressure for productivity, volume 
of patients, and independent organizational policies.  In addition, smaller hospitals, 
operational units, and other duty stations typically contain less bureaucracy; thereby, 
removing some of the administrative burden or “red tape” that often creates physician 
dissatisfaction.  Specifically, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda is positioned near 
Washington, D.C., but typically shared the overall care of beneficiaries with Walter Reed 
Army Medical Center.  Its proximity to the nation’s capital and the Navy’s Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery also places substantial political pressure on the staff assigned to 
National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda.  Those assigned to Naval Medical Center, 
Portsmouth and Naval Medical Center, San Diego face less direct political pressure; 
however, they have different challenges from being located near the two largest fleet 
concentration areas.  Furthermore, the impact of increased productivity pressure caused 
by the previous TRICARE contracts may have produced additional negative effects for 
National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda and Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth due to 
revised financing arrangements.  Based on the culmination of these factors, the 
continuation behavior of those assigned to one of the “Big 3” is expected to have a 
negative sign when compared to those assigned elsewhere. 
2. Dependent Variable (STAY) 
The dependent variable is binary.  If a physician, either generalist or specialist, 
was on active duty at the end of September 1999 (or September 2002), reached the end of 
his or her obligated service before October 2002 (or October 2004), and continued on 
active duty for longer than one year beyond his or her obligation, he or she is considered 
a stayer and the STAY variable assumes a value of 1.  If the physician separated from 
active duty at any time prior to serving more than one year beyond his or her obligation, 
the physician is considered a leaver and the STAY value takes on a value of 0.  Table 10 
presents a summary of the explanatory variables and their predicted effect on the 
dependent variable. 
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Table 10 Explanatory Variables and Expected Signs 




Demographic    
Gender    
MALE Dichotomous Base Case Base Case 
FEMALE Dichotomous - - 
Race/Ethnicity    
WHITE Dichotomous Base Case Base Case 
BLACK Dichotomous + + 
HISPANIC Dichotomous + + 
OTHERRACE Dichotomous + + 
Marital/Dependency Status    
MWC Dichotomous Base Case Base Case 
MNC Dichotomous + + 
SWC Dichotomous - - 
SNC Dichotomous + + 
Military Experience    
Deployment Status    
NODEPLOY Dichotomous Base Case Base Case 
DEPLOYED Dichotomous +/- +/- 
Years of Service    
YOS Continuous + + 
Occupational Specialty    
GM Dichotomous Base Case N/A 
FS Dichotomous + N/A 
UM Dichotomous + N/A 
PC Dichotomous N/A Base Case 
SURG Dichotomous N/A - 
OSPEC Dichotomous N/A - 
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Duty Type/Location    
NOBIG3 Dichotomous N/A Base Case 
NNMC Dichotomous N/A - 
NMCP Dichotomous N/A - 
NMCSD Dichotomous N/A - 
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V. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS  
A. OVERVIEW 
Initially, a Log Likelihood restricted model test was performed on the pooled 
sample of all generalists and specialists.  The outcome confirmed that separate models 
should be used for generalists and specialists.  Next, the cross-sectional data for 1999 and 
2002 were pooled and a single logistic regression model was estimated for generalists 
using the variables previously discussed and an indicator for year of eligibility.  The 
results of the pooled model indicated that the year of eligibility was insignificant.  As a 
consequence, a single model could be used for generalists.  Subsequently, a single 
logistic regression model was estimated for the combined GMO sample; however, it 
failed to capture the effect (if any) of the increased OPTEMPO on GMO continuation.  
Therefore, the initial logistic regression model was augmented with a difference-in-
difference estimator to evaluate the differing effects, before and after the increased 
OPTEMPO.  The functional form of the model was further improved when a squared 
term for the YOS variable (YOSSQ) was added to the model. 
With respect to specialists, the cross-sectional data were also pooled and a single 
logistic regression model was estimated using the aforementioned variables and an 
indicator for year of eligibility.  The results of the pooled model illustrated that the year 
of eligibility was significant.  A Log Likelihood restricted model test was subsequently 
performed and the results demonstrated that separate models for the two time periods 
were not necessary to analyze the specialist data appropriately.  Initially, a single logistic 
regression model was estimated for the combined specialist sample, but it failed to 
indicate whether the increased OPTEMPO affected the continuation behavior of 
specialists.  Thus, a difference-in-difference estimator was employed to determine if the 
increased OPTEMPO has influenced the continuation behavior of physician specialists.  
Additionally, to improve functional form, a squared term for the YOS variable (YOSSQ) 
was added to the regression model.  The new variable was significant and, for that reason, 
retained in the specialist model. 
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B. GENERAL MEDICAL OFFICER MODEL 
1. Initial Logistic Regression Model 
The combined GMO model utilized 12 variables, eight of which were statistically 
significant in explaining continuation behavior.  Table 11 shows the coefficient and level 
of significance for each variable.  All results are for one-tailed tests with the exception of 
the DEPLOYED variable 
Table 11 Logistic Regression Results for GMO Model, N=457 
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > Chisq 
INTERCEPT -7.5226 <0.0001 
YOS*** 1.5447 <0.0001 
YOSSQ*** -0.0627 <0.0001 
FEMALE -0.0678 0.4173 
BLACK* -1.1220 0.0699 
HISPANIC* -1.2507 0.0687 
OTHERRACE** 0.7071 0.0291 
MNC 0.5403 0.1921 
SWC* -0.7078 0.0679 
SNC -0.0666 0.4042 
DEPLOYED 0.1292 0.3113 
FS*** 0.7744 0.0033 
UM*** 1.4383 0.0004 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Log Likelihood Ratio (12 df) Chi-Square = 115.9707 <0.0001 
Generalized R-Square = 0.2241 Max-rescaled R-Square = 0.3284 
***  Significant at .01 level 
  **  Significant at .05 level 
    *  Significant at .10 level 
 
Goodness of fit can be evaluated by several methods:  global null hypothesis test, 
r-square, and the classification table.  The global null hypothesis test and Max-rescaled 
R-square results in Table 11 indicate that the model has a good fit and offers some 
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explanatory value.  Specifically, the Max-rescaled R-square for the GMO model is .3284 
indicating that the independent variables explain 32.84 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable.  Finally, the ability of a model to classify “stayers” and “leavers” 
accurately provides some indication of its usefulness.  The classification table results as 
shown in Table 12 show that the current GMO model correctly classifies 74.2 percent of 
the observations.  The “sensitivity” results for the model show that 74.8 percent of GMOs 
who continued on active duty were accurately classified while “specificity” results 
indicate the correct classification of 74.0 percent of those who separated.  Thus, the 
model is deemed to have a good fit. 
Table 12 Classification Table for General Medical Officer Model 















.260 89 250 88 30 74.2 74.8 74.0 49.7 10.7 
 
Despite the usefulness of the previously discussed GMO model, it fails to 
adequately evaluate if the increased OPTEMPO has affected the continuation behavior of 
GMOs.  As such, a difference-in-difference estimator is incorporated into the existing 
model to determine if the increased OPTEMPO has influenced the continuation behavior 
of General Medical Officers. 
2. GMO Logit Model with Difference-in-Difference Estimator 
a. Incorporation of a Difference-Difference Estimator 
To understand the true effect of the increased OPTEMPO, a difference-in-
difference estimator is employed using the same logistic regression framework.  Table 13 
illustrates the outcome of the regression incorporating the difference-in-difference 
estimator (FY02_DEPLOYED) and a variable to capture the common time trend (FY02).  
All results are one-tailed tests except for the DEPLOYED and FY02 variables.  The 
coefficient for the FY02 variable captures the change in continuation rates from 1999 to 
2002 while the coefficient for the DEPLOYED variable measures the effect of being 
deployed that is not due to the increased OPTEMPO.  The variable of interest, 
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FY02_DEPLOYED, measures the impact of the increased OPTEMPO on GMO 
continuation and was hypothesized to have a negative sign. 
Table 13 GMO Logit Model with Difference-in-Difference Estimator 
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > Chisq 
INTERCEPT*** -7.5303 <0.0001 
YOS*** 1.5144 <0.0001 
YOSSQ*** -0.0613 <0.0001 
FEMALE -0.0690 0.4165 
BLACK* -1.1243 0.0695 
HISPANIC* -1.2885 0.0650 
OTHERRACE** 0.7113 0.0289 
MNC 0.7036 0.1335 
SWC* -0.6438 0.0961 
SNC -0.0746 0.3956 
DEPLOYED 0.5201 0.1172 
FS*** 0.7635 0.0077 
UM*** 1.4203 0.0009 
FY02 0.3430 0.3582 
FY02_DEPLOYED** -0.9587 0.0307 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Log Likelihood Ratio (14 df) Chi-Square = 119.7020 <0.0001 
Generalized R-Square = 0.2304 Max-rescaled R-Square = 0.3377 
***  Significant at .01 level 
  **  Significant at .05 level 
    *  Significant at .10 level 
 
The fit of the difference-in-difference model is similar to the initial model, 
but the Max-rescaled R-Square indicates that 33.77 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables.  The classification table 
results, as shown in Table 14, indicate that the difference-in-difference model correctly 
classifies 73.7 percent of the observations.  Further, the “sensitivity” results for the model 
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show that 71.4 percent of GMOs who continued on active duty were accurately classified 
while “specificity” results indicate the correct classification of 74.6 percent of those who 
separated.  Thus, the model is deemed to have a good fit while providing a better 
estimation of the effect of the increased OPTEMPO. 
Table 14 Classification Table for GMO Difference-in-Difference Model 















.260 85 252 86 34 73.7 71.4 74.6 50.3 11.9 
 
b. Interpretation and Evaluation of Coefficients 
The years of service variables (YOS and YOSSQ) were found to be 
individually and jointly significant in the model.  The positive sign of the YOS variable 
signifies that years of service has a positive impact on the continuation behavior of 
GMOs.  However, the negative sign for the YOSSQ variable indicates that the overall 
positive effect will diminish.  To evaluate the total impact of years of service, the 
following equation for the turning point of the quadratic function was employed:  β1 ÷ 
2(β2) = 1.5144 ÷ 0.1226 = 12.35.  Therefore, the effect of years of service is positive but 
diminishing until an individual accumulates 12.35 years of service at which time the 
effect becomes negative.  The importance of this conversion from positive effect to 
negative effect is minimized since more than 98 percent of the observations have less 
than 12.35 years of service.  Furthermore, half of those exceeding the 12.35 years of 
service cutoff chose to stay in the military.  Years of service has an overall positive effect 
on the continuation behavior of GMOs.  As GMOs accumulate more years of service 
creditable towards military retirement, they are more likely to continue on active duty. 
The FEMALE variable is insignificant in the model indicating that gender 
does not influence the continuation behavior of GMOs.  It is possible that male and 
female General Medical Officers have similar perceptions regarding their military 
experience.  Therefore, the continuation behavior of females may be more strongly 
influenced by other factors that are shared by their male counterparts. 
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The test for joint significance of the race/ethnicity variables (BLACK, 
HISPANIC, OTHERRACE) showed that being a member of a minority group 
significantly influenced the continuation behavior of GMOs.  Both the BLACK and 
HISPANIC variables were statistically significant in the model at the .10 level.  Although 
the behavior of black and Hispanic GMOs appear similar across the combined sample, 
their behavior differs when the combined sample is segmented.  In fact, the continuation 
behavior of black GMOs increased from 1999 to 2002 while Hispanic GMOs continued 
at a much lower rate in 2002 when compared to 1999.  Regardless, the effects of both 
variables were significantly negative on continuation with respect to white GMOs.  The 
OTHERRACE variable was significant at the .05 level and produced a positive effect on 
GMO continuation compared to white GMOs in the combined sample despite the 
declining continuation rate in the latter time period.  The unexpected and different effects 
of BLACK and HISPANIC may have been partially influenced by self-selection and/or 
OPTEMPO; however, the effect of the OTHERRACE variable was as anticipated 
A test for joint significance of the marital/dependency status variables 
indicated that marital/dependency status does not significantly influence the continuation 
behavior of GMOs compared to those married with dependents.  In particular, GMOs 
without dependents (MNC and SNC) do not differ significantly from MWC in 
continuation behavior.  Conversely, the SWC variable was significant at the .10 level and 
negatively influenced continuation behavior of the group when compared to MWC, as 
expected.  The significantly larger percentage of SWCs in the 2002 sample, coupled with 
their reduced continuation rates, appear to indicate that the results were influenced by 
self-selection and/or OPTEMPO.  Regardless, the rigors of military service likely have 
the most negative impact on the continuation of single members with dependents. 
The occupational specialty variables (FS and UM) were individually and 
jointly significant in the model at the .01 level.  As anticipated, the positive signs indicate 
that being either a Flight Surgeon or Undersea Medicine physician significantly increases 
the likelihood of continuation when compared to General Medicine physicians.  Since 
these specialties receive more military-specific training, it is possible that GMOs with a  
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higher propensity to continue military service choose to receive this training and work in 
these occupational fields, either before receiving specialty training or throughout their 
military career. 
The DEPLOYED variable was insignificant leading to the conclusion that 
deployments before the increase in OPTEMPO had no significant effect on the 
continuation behavior of deployers when compared to those who did not deploy.  These 
findings differ from the positive effect found in many previous studies (Hosek & Totten, 
1998, Hosek & Totten, 2002, Fricker, 2002, Pierre, 2005). 
The FY02 variable, which captures the change in continuation rate from 
1999 to 2002, was insignificant in the model.  Conversely, the difference-in-difference 
estimator (FY02_DEPLOYED) was significant in the model at the .05 level and 
negatively influenced the continuation behavior of GMOs, as anticipated.  Hence, the 
results indicate that the increased OPTEMPO experienced in the latter period has 
produced a significant negative influence on the continuation of General Medical 
Officers.  To determine the degree of the negative influence of increased OPTEMPO and 
influence of other significant variables, the partial effects are calculated. 
c. Significant Variables and Partial Effects 
(1) Notional Person.  The notional person method is used to 
evaluate the partial effect of a single explanatory variable on the probability of 
continuation.  This is done by setting all the explanatory variables to their average values 
if they are continuous (YOS = 4.8759 and YOSSQ = 23.7744) and to zero in the case of 
dummy variables (all other variables in the model).  Each variable is independently tested 
by increasing it by one and the partial effect of that variable on the probability of 
continuation is determined by subtracting the result of this change from the continuation 
probability of the notional person (base case).  According to the GMO model results; 
there is a 16.75 percent chance that the notional person will continue on active duty.  The 
notional person is a married, white male with dependents.  He is a General Medicine 
physician with 4.88 years of service and he has not deployed prior to making his 
continuation decision. 
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(2) Partial Effects.  The partial effects of significant variables 
in the GMO difference-in-difference model are provided in Table 15.  The notional 
person has a 16.75 percent likelihood of continuation.  For someone similar to the 
notional person except that he has an additional year of service, the continuation rate 
increases by 15.38 percentage points.  If an individual is similar to the notional person 
except that he is black or Hispanic, the continuation rate decreases by 10.62 and 11.50 
percentage points, respectively.  If an individual has the same characteristics as the 
notional person except that he is not white, black or Hispanic, the continuation rate 
increases by 12.32 percentage points. 
The continuation rate declines by 7.19 percentage points if an 
individual is similar to the notional person except that he is single with dependents.  
Whenever an individual is similar to the notional person except that he is a Flight 
Surgeon or Undersea Medicine physician; the continuation rate increases by 13.41 and 
28.69 percentage points, respectively.  Most important, the probability of continuation 
declines by 9.59 percentage points when an individual is similar to the notional person 
except that he deployed after the OPTEMPO had increased 
Table 15 Partial Effects of GMO Difference-in-Difference Model 









***  Significant at .01 level 
  **  Significant at .05 level 
    *  Significant at .10 level 
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d. Restricted Model Tests 
Restricted model tests are conducted to determine whether or not a group 
of variables are jointly useful in a model.  The years of service, marital/dependency 
status, race/ethnicity status, and occupational specialty variables were tested to determine 
their joint significance.  The results of these tests are discussed below and summarized in 
Table 16. 
The years of service variables (YOS and YOSSQ) proved to be significant 
at the .01 level.  The results confirm the usefulness of years of service as a predictor for 
continuation behavior.  A test for joint significance was conducted for the 
martial/dependency status variables with results indicating that they are not jointly 
significant in the model.  Since the literature shows that marital/dependency status is 
important in retention analyses, the variables are retained in the model (Christensen et al., 
McMahon, Cooke et al., Hosek & Totten, 2002, and Fricker).  Race/ethnicity was found 
to be jointly significant at the .05 level.  This demonstrates that the race/ethnicity 
variables assist with predicting the continuation behavior of General Medical Officers.  
The occupational specialty variables also proved to be jointly significant at the .01 level.  
Therefore, occupational specialty is useful in predicting the continuation behavior of 
GMOs.  
Table 16 GMO Difference-in-Difference Model Joint Significance Tests 
Test Wald Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Years of Service 49.0326 2 <0.0001 
Marital/Dependency Status 3.4432 3 0.3282 
Race/Ethnicity 8.6162 3 0.0349 
Occupational Specialty 13.4693 2 0.0012 
 
e. Potential Problems with Model 
Potential problem areas for logistic regression models can exist due to 
functional form misspecification, multicollinearity, and/or omitted variable bias.  
Functional form misspecification can lead to biased estimators of all the coefficients by 
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not accounting for the relationship between the dependent and observed explanatory 
variables.  In the GMO model, functional form misspecification was previously 
addressed by adding a squared term for years of service (YOSSQ).  Subsequently, the 
YOSSQ variable was significant and therefore retained in the model. 
Multicollinearity results when there is a high degree of correlation among 
several explanatory variables as they are measuring similar things.  Multicollinearity does 
not produce biased estimators; however, it inflates the variances of predicted values and 
can produce unstable coefficients and incorrect signs.  In small and moderate sample 
sizes, multicollinearity may result in the lack of statistical significance of individual 
independent variables while the overall model may be strongly significant.  Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIFs) were evaluated for each variable in the model to test for 
multicollinearity.  The VIF shows how multicollinearity has increased the instability of 
the coefficient estimate.  For models with a low r-square, the preferred method to 
compare the independent variable’s VIF to the model VIF.  The model VIF is calculated 
using the following equation:  1 ÷ (1 – R-square) = 1 ÷ (1 – 0.2365) = 1.3098.  If the VIF 
for the variable exceeds the model VIF, then degrading multicollinearity may exist.  The 
results of the VIF test for the GMO model indicated that the YOS, YOSSQ, FY02, 
DEPLOYED, and FY02_DEPLOYED variables have VIFs exceeding the model VIF 
which is expected given the nature of these variables in the current model. 
Another potential problem for the GMO difference-in-difference model is 
omitted variable bias.  The modest Max-rescaled R-square (0.3377) indicates that useful 
variables were omitted from the model.  Variables such as civilian-military pay disparity, 
unemployment rate, and satisfaction with military life, among others, are often useful in 
explaining the retention behavior of military members.  The inclusion of these variables 
would improve the model’s predictive value and reduce any bias in coefficient estimates. 
3. Comparison of Models 
The initial logistic regression model indicates that deployments are unimportant in 
the continuation decision.  Given the increased OPTEMPO, these results can be 
misleading especially if the increased OPTEMPO creates an opposite effect from the 
previous period.  Since the focus of this thesis is to determine whether the effect of 
increased OPTEMPO produced a significant effect on continuation behavior, the 
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difference-in-difference model is preferred.  The difference-in-difference estimator 
provides the results needed to determine whether the continuation behavior of GMOs was 
influenced by the increased OPTEMPO.  The final results of the difference-in-difference 
model show that the increased OPTEMPO has produced a significant negative effect on 
GMO continuation behavior, as hypothesized. 
C. SPECIALIST MODEL 
1. Initial Logistic Regression Model 
The combined specialist model incorporated 13 variables, of which 7 were 
statistically significant in explaining continuation behavior.  The coefficient and level of 
significance is listed in Table 17.  Only DEPLOYED was tested with a two-tailed test. 
Table 17 Logistic Regression Results for Specialist Model, N=863 
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > Chisq 
INTERCEPT*** -4.0217 <0.0001 
YOS*** 0.7860 <0.0001 
YOSSQ*** -0.0235 <0.0001 
FEMALE -0.0924 0.3062 
MINORITY 0.2703 0.1220 
MNC 0.3338 0.1237 
SWC 0.5537 0.1297 
SNC** 0.4727 0.0143 
DEPLOYED** 0.4264 0.0316 
SURG*** -1.7409 <0.0001 
OSPEC*** -1.2826 <0.0001 
NNMC -0.2444 0.2055 
NMCP -0.2115 0.2071 
NMCSD** 0.4470 0.0467 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Log Likelihood Ratio (13 df) Chi-Square = 184.6483 <0.0001 
Generalized R-Square = 0.1926 Max-rescaled R-Square = 0.2577 
***  Significant at .01 level 
  **  Significant at .05 level 
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The specialist model has a good fit based on the global hypothesis test and R-
square presented in Table 17.  Specifically, the Max-rescaled R-square for the specialist 
model is .2577 indicating that the explanatory variables explain 25.77 percent of the 
variation in the dependent variable.  Additionally, Table 18 shows the classification table 
which indicates that the model correctly classifies 65.8 percent of the observations.  As 
shown, the “sensitivity” results for the model show that 69.7 percent of specialists who 
continued on active duty were accurately classified while “specificity” results indicate the 
correct classification of 61.1 percent of those who separated. 
Table 18 Classification Table for Specialist Model 















0.56 331 237 151 144 65.8 69.7 61.1 31.3 37.8 
 
Unfortunately, the initial logistic regression model does not permit the evaluation 
of the effect (if any) of increased OPTEMPO on the continuation behavior of specialists.  
Therefore, the addition of a difference-in-difference estimator is necessary to facilitate 
the analysis. 
2. Specialist Logit Model with Difference-in-Difference Estimator 
a. Incorporation of a Difference-Difference Estimator 
As previously done with the General Medical Officer model, a difference-
in-difference estimator is employed using the same logistic regression framework to 
evaluate the effect of the increased OPTEMPO.  Table 19 illustrates the regression results 
incorporating the difference-in-difference estimator (FY02_DEPLOYED) and a variable 
to capture the common time trend (FY02).  All results are one-tailed tests except for the 
DEPLOYED and FY02 variables.  The coefficient for the FY02 variable captures the 
change in continuation rates from 1999 to 2002 while the coefficient for the DEPLOYED 
variable measures the effect of being deployed that is not due to the increased 
OPTEMPO.  The variable of interest, FY02_DEPLOYED, measures the impact of the 
increased OPTEMPO on specialist continuation and was hypothesized to have a negative 
sign. 
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Table 19 Specialist Logit Model with Difference-in-Difference Estimator 
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > Chisq 
INTERCEPT*** -3.9078 <0.0001 
YOS*** 0.7717 <0.0001 
YOSSQ*** -0.0228 <0.0001 
FEMALE -0.0867 0.3178 
MINORITY 0.2814 0.1133 
MNC 0.3203 0.1353 
SWC 0.6334 0.1016 
SNC** 0.4278 0.0244 
DEPLOYED*** 0.8601 0.0046 
SURG*** -1.7343 <0.0001 
OSPEC*** -1.2495 <0.0001 
NNMC -0.2578 0.1936 
NMCP -0.1876 0.2354 
NMCSD** 0.4627 0.0423 
FY02 -0.1735 0.1730 
FY02_DEPLOYED** -0.6879 0.0482 
Goodness of Fit Measures 
Log Likelihood Ratio (15 df) Chi-Square = 191.0467 <0.0001 
Generalized R-Square = 0.1986 Max-rescaled R-Square = 0.2657 
***  Significant at .01 level 
  **  Significant at .05 level 
The goodness of fit for the difference-in-difference model is similar to the 
previous specialist model, but the Max-rescaled R-Square indicates that the independent 
variables explain 26.57 percent of the variation in the dependent variable.  As shown in 
Table 20, the classification table results indicate that the difference-in-difference model 
correctly classifies 65.1 percent of the observations.  Further, the model correctly 
classifies 68.4 percent of the stayers and 61.1 percent of the leavers as indicated by the 
“sensitivity” and specificity results, respectively.  Hence, the model has a good fit and 
provides a better estimation of the true effect of the increased OPTEMPO. 
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Table 20 Classification Table for Specialist Difference-in-Difference Model 















0.56 325 237 151 150 65.1 68.4 61.1 31.7 38.8 
 
b. Interpretation and Evaluation of Coefficients 
The years of service variables (YOS and YOSSQ) were found to be 
individually and jointly significant in the specialist model.  The positive sign of the YOS 
variable indicates that the number of years of service has a positive influence on the 
continuation behavior of specialists, as anticipated.  The negative sign for the YOSSQ 
variable is a sign that the positive effect diminishes.  To evaluate the total impact of years 
of service, the following equation for the turning point of the quadratic function was 
employed:  β1 ÷ 2(β2) = 0.7717 ÷ 0.0456 = 16.92.  Therefore, the effect of years of 
service is positive but diminishing until an individual accumulates 16.92 years of service 
then the effect becomes negative.  The significance of this switch from positive effect to 
negative effect is diminished since more than 96 percent of the individuals have less than 
16.92 years of service.  Furthermore, 75 percent of those exceeding the 16.92 years of 
service turn-around point chose to stay in the military.  Thus, years of service has an 
overall positive effect on the continuation behavior of specialists.  As specialists 
accumulate more years of service creditable towards military retirement, they are more 
inclined to continue on active duty. 
Similar to the GMO model, the FEMALE variable was insignificant in the 
specialist model.  Gender does not appear to influence the continuation behavior of 
specialists in the current sample.  Given the profession and typical working environment, 
it is possible that males and females view their military obligations similarly without the 
obstacles that generally create gender-specific behavioral differences. 
The race/ethnicity variables were found to be jointly insignificant in the 
model and subsequent linear hypothesis tests failed to distinguish any significant 
differences between the BLACK, HISPANIC, and OTHERRACE variables.  As such, the 
variables were combined to create a new variable (MINORITY) because membership in a 
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minority group is generally believed to influence behavior, either positively or 
negatively.  The MINORITY variable also proved to be insignificant in the model.  Since 
the sample has a relatively small percentage of minority members with various 
race/ethnic backgrounds, these results are not surprising. 
A test for joint significance of the marital/dependency status variables 
indicated that marital/dependency status does significantly influence the continuation 
behavior of specialists.  Specifically, the SNC variable was significant at the .05 level and 
positively influenced continuation behavior compared to MWC.  In contrast, married 
specialists without dependents (MNC) had no significant impact on continuation.  The 
difference in continuation behavior for specialists without dependents (MNC and SNC) 
might be explained by the discomfort associated with being separated from a spouse.  In 
addition, those who are single probably have greater mobility since they are not 
constrained by coordinating spousal employment and other challenges linked to family 
responsibilities.  Surprisingly, the SWC variable was insignificant in the model.  The 
expected negative impact did not materialize, but this may result from the selection of 
occupational specialties that minimize the negative impacts of military service (i.e. 
choosing a specialty with limited deployment possibility or choosing a specialty that 
restricts the likelihood of relocation).  Alternatively, dedicated specialists may have 
adjusted to the rigors of military service and made the appropriate accommodations for 
their dependents; thereby, facilitating their continued military service. 
The occupational specialty variables (SURG and OSPEC) were 
individually and jointly significant in the model at the .01 level.  As predicted, the 
negative signs indicate that being either a surgical specialist or any other specialist (not 
primary care or surgical) significantly decreases the likelihood of continuation when 
compared to Primary Care specialists.  Since these specialties typically receive more 
specialized training and face a larger civilian-military pay disparity, they are more prone 
to pursue a lucrative civilian career than primary care specialists, all else being equal. 
The duty type/location variables (NNMC, NMCP, NMCSD) were jointly 
insignificant in the model; however, they were retained to determine if any were 
individually significant and if the effect was as anticipated.  Only NMCSD was 
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significant in the model, at the .05 level; but the effect was opposite of the expected 
negative effect.  Both NNMC and NMCP had negative signs, as anticipated, but neither 
was significant.  The unexpected positive impact of the NMCSD variable may reflect 
organizational-specific or geographic-specific attributes that affect the continuation 
decision.  Possibly, the political pressures and bureaucratic aspects of normal operations 
creates a less stressful working environment at NMCSD.  Conversely, physicians 
assigned to NMCSD may face factors outside the military environment that prompt 
continued military service (i.e. community support, cost of living, employment 
opportunities, etc).  Regardless of the specific cause, specialists stationed at NMCSD 
when making their first continuation decision tend to stay in the military at significantly 
higher rates than those assigned elsewhere. 
The DEPLOYED variable, which captured the effect of deployment 
before the increased OPTEMPO, was significant in the model at the .01 level leading to 
the tentative conclusion that deployments positively affect the continuation behavior of 
specialists.  These findings match the positive effect found in many previous studies 
(Hosek & Totten, 1998, Hosek & Totten, 2002, Fricker, 2002, Pierre, 2005).  
Unfortunately, these results do not directly address the primary concern of this thesis – 
determining the effect of increased OPTEMPO on continuation behavior.  Since the 
OPTEMPO has significantly increased from 1999 to 2002 and the continuation rates of 
those who actually deployed decreased, the difference-in-difference estimator 
(FY02_DEPLOYED) is used to determine the real impact of deployments in the 2002 
sample relative to the 1999 sample. 
As with the GMO model, the FY02 variable was insignificant in the 
model.  In contrast, the difference-in-difference estimator (FY02_DEPLOYED) was 
significant in the model at the .05 level and negatively influenced the continuation 
behavior of specialists, as hypothesized.  Therefore, the results indicate that the increased 
OPTEMPO experienced in the latter period has produced a significant negative influence 
on the continuation of specialists.  To determine the degree of the negative influence of 
increased OPTEMPO and influence of other significant variables, the partial effects are 
calculated. 
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c. Significant Variables and Partial Effects 
(1) Notional Person.  The results of the specialist model 
indicate that the notional person has a 75.21 percent chance of continuing on active duty.  
The notional person is a white male who is married with dependents.  He is a primary 
care specialist with approximately 8.79 years of service and was not assigned to National 
Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, or Naval Medical 
Center, San Diego when making his retention decision.  Furthermore, he has not 
deployed (as a specialist) prior to making his retention decision. 
(2) Partial Effects.  Table 21 shows the partial effect of 
significant variables in the specialist difference-in-difference model.  The notional person 
has a 75.21 percent probability of continuing his military service.  For a person similar to 
the notional person except that he has an additional year of service, the probability of 
continuation increases by 5.55 percentage points.  If an individual is comparable to the 
notional person with the exception of being single with no dependents, the likelihood of 
continuation increases by 7.10 percentage points. 
The chance of continuation increases by 12.55 percentage points 
for an individual sharing the same characteristics as the notional person except that he 
deployed before the operational tempo increased.  Conversely, the probability of 
continuation decreases by 40.33 percentage points for a person similar to the notional 
person except that he is a surgical specialist.  Likewise, the chance of continuation 
decreases by 28.69 percentage points if the individual is exactly like the notional person 
with the exception of not being a primary care or surgical specialist.  If the notional 
person were assigned to Naval Medical Center, San Diego when making the retention 
decision, the likelihood of continuation increases by 7.60 percentage points compared to 
being assigned to anywhere else other than Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth or 
National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda.  For a person similar to the notional person 
except that he deployed after the operational tempo increased, the probability of 
continuation decreases by 14.81 percentage points. 
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Table 21 Partial Effects of Specialist Difference-in-Difference Model 








***  Significant at .01 level 
  **  Significant at .05 level 
 
d. Restricted Model Tests 
The years of service, marital/dependency status, race/ethnicity status, 
occupational specialty, and duty type/location variables were tested to determine if they 
were jointly significant in the model.  Additionally, linear hypothesis tests for 
combinations of the race/ethnicity variables were conducted to evaluate the possibility of 
combining categories due to small sample sizes and previous research indicating different 
effects of race/ethnicity in determining the continuation behavior of specialists 
(Christensen et al., McMahon et al.).  Table 22 summarizes the restricted model tests for 
the specialist model. 
A test for joint significance indicated that the years of service variables 
were jointly significant at the .01 level.  Hence, the variables together are jointly 
significant in predicting the continuation behavior of specialists.  Likewise, the 
marital/dependency variables were shown to be jointly significant at the .10 level.  As 
such, the SWC, MNC, and SNC variables are useful in predicting the behavior of 
specialists facing the continuation decision.  A test of joint significance for the 
race/ethnicity variables indicates that race/ethnicity is not important is predicting the 
continuation behavior of specialists.  Given that nearly 90 percent of the sample is white, 
77 
these results are not surprising.  However, as the racial composition of physician 
specialists becomes more diverse, the impact of race/ethnicity may become more 
pronounced as indicated in other research with more racially diverse samples (Fricker, 
Hosek & Totten).  Therefore, some indication of minority membership is deemed 
important in the analysis.  The linear hypothesis tests failed to identify any significant 
differences between the behavior of blacks and Hispanics, blacks and members of other 
racial groups, and Hispanics and members of other racial groups.  In fact, no significant 
differences could be found between any of the race/ethnicity variables.  Consequently, all 
race/ethnicity variables were combined into a new variable (MINORITY) that 
encompasses all non-white members of the specialist sample. 
The occupational specialty variables were found to be jointly significant in 
the model at the .01 level.  These results indicate that the variables together are 
significant in the model and that occupational specialty is important in predicting 
continuation behavior.  In contrast, the joint significance test for duty type/location 
indicates that duty type/location is insignificant in predicting continuation behavior.  
Since one of the research questions of this thesis pertains to duty type/location, the choice 
was made to leave them in the model to determine if any of the three variables, 
individually, had a significant effect and if the effect was as anticipated. 
Table 22 Specialist Difference-in-Difference Model Joint Significance Tests 
Test Wald Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Years of Service 93.8738 2 <0.0001 
Marital/Dependency Status 5.6024 3 0.1326 
Race/Ethnicity* 3.0905 3 0.3779 
Occupational Specialty 69.1104 2 <0.0001 
Duty Type/Location 4.8774 3 0.1810 
* Test conducted prior to combining variables into a single variable (MINORITY) 
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e. Potential Problems with Model 
In the specialist difference-in-difference model, a squared term for years 
of service (YOSSQ) was previously added to address functional form misspecification.  
As a result of its significance in the model, it was retained.  Similar to the GMO model, 
multicollinearity exists between some of the variables in the current model.  The VIF test 
showed that multicollinearity existed between the YOS, YOSSQ, SURG, OSPEC, 
DEPLOYED, FY02, and FY02_DEPLOYED variables.  Much of the collinearity is 
expected due to the nature of the variables involved; however, the collinearity connected 
with the SURG and OSPEC variables is primarily caused by the training obligation 
associated with certain occupational specialties resulting in more years of service before 
reaching the retention decision point. 
Another potential problem for the specialist difference-in-difference 
model is omitted variable bias.  The moderate Max-rescaled R-square (0.2657) indicates 
that useful variables were likely omitted from the model.  Variables such as civilian-
military pay differential, unemployment rate, and satisfaction with military life, among 
others, are often useful in explaining the retention behavior of military members.  The 
incorporation of these variables would likely improve the model’s predictive value and 
reduce bias in the coefficients. 
3. Comparison of Models 
The initial logistic regression model of the combined specialist sample indicates 
that deployments have a significant positive effect on the continuation decision similar to 
the majority of previous research.  However, the difference-in-difference model clearly 
demonstrates that the increased OPTEMPO is producing a significantly different effect 
on the continuation behavior of specialists.  The extremely significant positive effect of 
deployments prior to the increased OPTEMPO appears to mask the detrimental effects of 
deployments after the increase in OPTEMPO.  The difference-in-difference model 
identifies a clear demarcation of specialist continuation behavior.  Given the intent of this 
thesis, the difference-in-difference model is the best empirical model to answer the 
question.  Previously, deployments produced a significant positive effect on the 
continuation behavior of specialists, but current operations appear to yield a substantially 
different effect.  The initial logistic regression model does not capture the differing 
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effects.  Even more troubling, the initial logistic regression results could lead to 
conclusions that the increased OPTEMPO has not impacted the positive effect of 
deployments on continuation.  Therefore, the difference-in-difference model is preferred 
to answer the posited question and to demonstrate the impact of increased OPTEMPO on 
the continuation behavior of specialists. 
D. SUMMARY 
The factors affecting the continuation behavior of generalists and specialists are 
substantially different; thereby, requiring the estimation of different models.  For both 
generalists and specialists, the pooled sample did not reveal substantial differences across 
the two time periods.  Thus, separate models were not required for each time period to 
evaluate the continuation behavior of specialists and generalists.  Although the initial 
logistic regression model for generalists failed to demonstrate that deployments exerted a 
significant effect on continuation behavior, the thesis sought to determine the effect (if 
any) that the increased OPTEMPO had on continuation.  Therefore, a difference-in-
difference estimator was utilized to isolate the effect.  As a result, the effect of increased 
OPTEMPO was determined to have significantly reduced the continuation behavior of 
generalists by 9.59 percentage points. 
With regards to specialists, the initial logistic regression model indicated that 
deployments produced a significant positive effect on the continuation behavior.  
Unfortunately, the results do not distinguish the effect of increased OPTEMPO 
experienced in the latter time period.  Again, a difference-in-difference estimator was 
employed to determine if the effect was significantly different due to increased 
OPTEMPO.  The revised model illustrated that deployments generally have a significant 
positive effect on continuation; however, the effect due to the increased OPTEMPO was 
significantly negative.  In the end, the effect of increased OPTEMPO was associated with 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Retention studies are conducted to identify factors that significantly impact an 
individual’s retention decision, either positively or negatively, so that policies can be 
developed and implemented to achieve the desired retention behavior needed to meet 
manpower requirements.  Although limited, this study identifies some potential factors 
affecting the retention behavior of Navy physicians.  Further, the study explores the 
impact of increased OPTEMPO, subsequent to September 11th, on the retention behavior 
of physicians. 
While this thesis focused on the effect of increased OPTEMPO on Medical Corps 
officer retention, the current difficulties in attracting and retaining physicians presents a 
multi-faceted problem.  The effects of increased tempo may inadvertently capture some 
of these additional problems:  civilian-military pay gap, increased pressure for 
productivity, administrative burden, and other pecuniary and non-pecuniary issues not 
incorporated in the analysis.  Regardless, the preliminary analysis indicated that the 
retention of General Medical Officers (GMOs) and specialists declined from 2002 to 
2005.  The decline in GMO retention was not significantly different; however, the 8 
percentage point decrease for specialists was significant. 
1. General Medical Officers 
The demographic characteristics of the GMO samples varied little across time.  
The only significant differences were the increase of physicians who were single with 
dependents and a decrease in physicians who were single without dependents.  The 
military experiences of GMOs were also similar; however, physicians in the latter sample 
experienced significantly more deployments, as anticipated.  The continuation rates for 
GMOs only varied appreciably for those who deployed or those who were Undersea 
Medicine physicians, both of which experienced notably lower continuation rates in the 
2002 sample when compared to the 1999 sample. 
Regression analysis of the combined GMO model illustrated that years of service, 
race, being single with dependents, and occupational specialty significantly affected 
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retention behavior.  An additional year of service, being a member of another racial group 
(not white, black, or Hispanic), being a Flight Surgeon, and being an Undersea Medicine 
physician positively affected retention.  The negative influences included being black, 
Hispanic, or being single with dependents.  The analysis of the combined GMO model 
failed to demonstrate that deployments drastically affected the retention decision.  To 
evaluate if the increased OPTEMPO significantly altered the retention behavior of 
GMOs, a difference-in-difference estimator was employed.  The subsequent results of the 
difference-in-difference model showed that GMOs who deployed after the increase in 
OPTEMPO were considerably less likely to continue military service. 
2. Specialists 
The demographic attributes of specialists were similar across the two samples 
with only two significant exceptions:  an increased percentage of black specialists in 
2002 and an increased percentage of single specialists with dependents.  The military 
experiences of specialists were also comparable; however, specialists in the 2002 sample 
experienced significantly more deployments, as expected.  The continuation rates for 
specialists deviated considerably for the following subgroups:  white specialists, males, 
those married with dependents, those single with dependents, those assigned to any duty 
station other than the “Big 3”, those assigned to Naval Medical Center, San Diego, those 
who deployed, primary care specialists, and other specialists (not primary care or 
surgical). 
Regression analysis of the combined specialist model illustrated that years of 
service, being single without dependents, being deployed, being assigned to Naval 
Medical Center, San Diego and occupational specialty significantly affected continuation 
behavior.  An additional year of service, being single without dependents, being 
deployed, and being assigned to Naval Medical Center, San Diego positively affected 
retention.  Being a surgical specialist or other specialist (not primary or surgical) 
significantly lowers the probability of continuation.  In addition, the difference-in-
difference estimator indicated that the increased OPTEMPO has produced a significant 
negative effect on specialist continuation despite the overall positive impact of 




The inherent nature of the military requires military physicians to deploy, when 
directed, to support military operations.  Thus, no viable solution can minimize the 
deployment of physicians without endangering Force Health Protection; however, the 
Navy should attempt to minimize deployments that are not mission-essential.  In addition, 
an indirect solution could focus on the removal of fundamental factors creating physician 
dissatisfaction.  The 2005 Quick Poll indicated that physicians are most inclined to leave 
the military due to administrative barriers while increased pressures for productivity also 
prompt physicians to leave.  Regardless, the following recommendations are proposed to 
counter the Navy’s current and future retention and recruitment difficulties created by 
increased OPTEMPO: 
Short Term 
• Increase amounts of special pays for critical specialties most negatively 
impacted by the current operational environment.  The added pays may 
motivate more physicians to continue their military service.  In addition, 
special pays can be adjusted annually, as needed, to attain the desired 
retention behavior. 
• Pursue accession bonuses to augment the current force structure by 
obtaining specialty-trained physicians.  The accession bonuses would 
alleviate some short term challenges by providing access to trained 
specialists. 
• Increase utilization of reserve physicians to fill requests for support, where 
authorized.  Reserve physicians augment the active force during periods of 
conflict and can ease some of the hardships created by the increased 
OPTEMPO. 
Long Term 
• Explore opportunities for performance-based incentives with concessions 
for those who endure the rigors of operational medicine.  The 
implementation of managed care has created increased pressure for 
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productivity without the same financial incentives available in civilian 
healthcare organizations.  Performance-based incentives may assist in 
retaining high-quality, productive physicians; but some consideration must 
be given to physicians working in arduous environments without high 
patient volume. 
The above recommendations may not fully solve Navy Medicine’s physician 
retention problem; however, they are proposed as alternative mechanisms to explore in 
addressing the myriad of issues creating the retention challenge.  Although monetary 
incentives are frequently pursued, the civilian opportunities available to physicians, 
coupled with a relatively safer working environment, may limit the ability to achieve the 
desired levels of retention given the current OPTEMPO.  Another potential remedy is to 
increase the active duty obligation for AFHPSP and USUHS accessions.  However, it 
will likely exacerbate the current recruiting problem.  As such, more emphasis may be 
needed on eliminating other dissatisfiers that contribute to the physicians’ propensity to 
leave military service. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The opportunities for further research regarding physician retention are numerous 
and varied.  Most previous research focused on the civilian military pay gap which 
remains an item of interest; especially given the changes in OPTEMPO and integration of 
managed care.  As the military embraces managed care, the perception and behavior of 
military physicians are expected to change.  The enhanced emphasis on productivity, 
coupled with the rigors of military service, may lead to more retention difficulties.  Thus, 
this research can be extended by encompassing some qualitative information regarding 
physicians’ perceptions of Navy Medicine in the current environment.  The 2005 Quick 
Poll provides some insight; however, a more focused survey of physicians would be 
useful. 
Regarding the effect of increased OPTEMPO, additional research could look at 
other health care professionals in Navy Medicine (nurses, administrators, and dentists) to 
determine if the effect is similar.  In addition, a cross-service comparison of physician 
continuation behavior may provide additional insight regarding the severity of the overall 
physician retention problem in the military.  Furthermore, the current analysis focused on 
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increased OPTEMPO, but was unable to distinguish between different deployment 
environments (shipboard, Marine Corps units) or geographical regions (Afghanistan, 
Iraq, OCONUS support, etc).  This additional information would have been useful in 
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